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abstract. Third-party standing is relevant to a wide range of constitutional and statutory

cases. The Supreme Court has said that, to assert such standing, a litigant must ordinarily have a
close relationship with the right holder and the right holder must face obstacles to suing on their
own behalf. Yet the Court does not seem to apply that test consistently, and commentators have
long critiqued the third-party standing doctrine as incoherent. This Article argues that much of
the doctrine’s perceived incoherence stems from the Supreme Court’s attempt to capture, in a single principle, disparate scenarios raising distinct problems of both theory and practice. The Article
“unpacks” third-party standing in two respects. First, it identifies true third-party standing problems by distinguishing them from first-party claims, largely by reference to the “zone-of-interests”
concept. If litigants fall within the zone of interests of the substantive right they wish to invoke
and they have an injury in fact, they may establish first-party standing based on their own rights.
If they do not fall within the zone of interests, then they must rely on the rights of third parties.
Second, the Article distinguishes among three types of parties invoking third-party standing: directly regulated parties, collaterally injured parties, and representative parties. The results in the
Court’s third-party standing cases tend to track these distinctions, and we argue that it is time for
the Court to recognize them in doctrine. The Article also rejects prior eﬀorts by scholars to posit a
general “valid rule” requirement as a way of reconciling the cases, an approach that we contend is
both under and overinclusive. The Article concludes by highlighting aspects of modern litigation
practice that may need revision in light of the unpacked third-party standing doctrine.
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unpacking third-party standing

introduction
The Supreme Court has said that third-party standing is generally not allowed. A litigant normally “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and
cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”1
But this rule seems to be honored in the breach. The Court has described the
third-party standing doctrine as a “prudential” limitation that can be overcome
based on various considerations,2 and has on many occasions allowed such
standing. The Court has said that litigants invoking third-party rights must have
a close relationship to the right holders, and that the right holders must face
obstacles to suing on their own behalf.3 But the Court often fails to apply this
“relationship-plus-obstacle” test. It has not done so, for example, in some cases
involving vendors of goods and services who assert violations of their customers’
rights.4 To make matters more uncertain, the Court has in recent years questioned the very idea of prudential standing limits.5 Unsurprisingly, commentators have long doubted the coherence, and even lawfulness, of the third-party
standing doctrine.6
Controversy over third-party standing doctrine intensified in 2020 in connection with the June Medical Services case before the Supreme Court.7 In that
case, abortion doctors in Louisiana challenged a state law requiring them to have
admitting privileges at a nearby hospital. Louisiana argued that the doctors
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (“[L]imitations on a litigant’s assertion of jus
tertii are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary ‘rule of self-restraint’
designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies where the applicable constitutional questions are ill-defined and speculative.”).
See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004); Singleton v. Wulﬀ, 428 U.S. 106, 11416 (1976) (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 682-84 (1977) (permitting third-party
standing for a seller of nonmedical contraceptive devices challenging the constitutionality of
state laws governing the sale and distribution of contraceptives); Craig, 429 U.S. at 193-97
(permitting third-party standing for a vendor of alcohol challenging the constitutionality of
gender-based diﬀerentials in state liquor laws).
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125-26 (2014) (suggesting that prudential standing limits are “in some tension with . . . the principle that ‘a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide’ cases within its jurisdiction ‘is virtually unflagging’”
(quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013)).
See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 243 (1988) (describing
“[t]he apparent lawlessness of so-called third party standing” as “an enduring and notorious
problem”); see also Brian Charles Lea, The Merits of Third-Party Standing, 24 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 277, 280 (2015) (“[T]he need for a coherent theory of third-party standing has been
evident for at least fifty years.”).
June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
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lacked third-party standing to raise the abortion rights of their clients.8 A majority of the Court upheld the doctors’ third-party standing, but its decision did
nothing to clarify the doctrine.9 There was no majority opinion on the issue. A
plurality relied, in part, on Louisiana’s failure to raise the standing argument until it reached the Supreme Court, and did not explain how the traditional relationship-plus-obstacle test was satisfied.10 Several Justices dissented on the
standing issue.11
Despite their disagreements, all the Justices who addressed the issue in June
Medical Services wrote as if a unitary doctrine governed third-party standing. The
plurality acknowledged a “rule” against third-party standing, but said that this
rule was “hardly absolute.”12 Similarly, Justice Thomas’s dissent referred (critically) to “our prudential third-party standing doctrine,”13 and Justice Alito’s dissent invoked “our established test for third-party standing.”14

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

4

See Brief for the Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 25-26, June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (No.
18-1323).
See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2118-19 (plurality opinion); id. at 2139 n.4 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 2118-19 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Roberts did not join the plurality opinion,
but stated that he agreed with its reasoning on standing. See id. at 2139 n.4 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 2142-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2167 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined in relevant
part by Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ.).
Id. at 2118 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2142 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2165 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2174 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (stating that the
relationship-plus-obstacle test must always be met in order to establish third-party standing).
Texas’s enactment in 2021 of a controversial abortion restriction once again implicated thirdparty standing issues—but this time with a diﬀerent ideological valence. See Sabrina
Tavernise, Citizens, Not the State, Will Enforce New Abortion Law in Texas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/09/us/abortion-law-regulations-texas.html
[https://perma.cc/L7C7-SJAK]. In addition to banning abortions after six weeks of pregnancy, the law allows private citizens to sue anyone who helps a woman obtain an abortion in
violation of the ban, while at the same time disallowing enforcement of the ban by state government oﬃcials. In other words, the law relies on enforcement by private parties whose
rights are not implicated by the law; those plaintiﬀs must eﬀectively invoke third-party standing to assert the sovereign rights of the state. These suits can be brought in state courts, where
somewhat diﬀerent state law standing doctrines will control. Neither of those features of the
law is especially unusual. But what is unusual is that they are employed entirely in place of
public enforcement, a move that appears to be aimed at making it more diﬃcult to challenge
the abortion ban in federal court. Commentators who are normally supportive of a broad approach to standing were highly critical of the Texas approach. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe &
Stephen I. Vladeck, Texas Tries to Upend the Legal System with Its Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES
(July 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/opinion/texas-abortion-law

unpacking third-party standing

In this Article, we argue that much of the third-party standing doctrine’s incoherence stems from the attempt to capture, in a single principle, disparate scenarios raising distinct problems of both theory and practice. The third-party
standing doctrine needs to be unpacked. We do not maintain that this will solve
all of its problems. But unpacking the general question will resolve many issues
and provide a more helpful frame to understand those that remain. Our approach also suggests that third-party standing problems may lurk in areas not
previously considered to be within the doctrine’s scope.
We propose to unpack the doctrine in two respects. First, we identify true
third-party standing problems by distinguishing them from first-party claims.
True third-party standing problems arise only if the underlying law confers no
right on the litigant wishing to invoke it. There seems to be general agreement
on this point, but neither courts nor scholars have identified with precision the
nature of the right required for standing. We argue—reviving an insight that
Professor Tribe oﬀered decades ago15—that the answer lies with the familiar
“zone-of-interests” test. If litigants fall within the zone of interests of the substantive right they invoke and they have an injury in fact, they may rely on their
own first-party rights for standing. If they fall outside the zone of interests, they
must rely on the rights of third parties. That move, we suggest, helps resolve
ambiguities across standing doctrine in both constitutional and statutory cases.
By relying on the zone-of-interests concept to distinguish first- and thirdparty claims, we reject two prominent alternative approaches. One is the leading
suggestion in the literature, often echoed in judicial dictum, that parties lack
first-party rights unless they have a “cause of action” to enforce those rights.16
But as we explain, standing doctrine frequently asks who may assert a right in
contexts in which no cause of action is necessary. It makes little sense, for example, to demand that a party establish an aﬃrmative cause of action in order to
assert a right or claim as a defense to someone else’s lawsuit.

-reward.html [https://perma.cc/WH8G-AXXQ]. We discuss below the standing issues arising when the government seeks to delegate its enforcement authority, infra Section III.C. In
September 2021, after the U.S. Supreme Court declined to enjoin enforcement of the law, the
federal government sued Texas, contending that the law was unconstitutional. See Katie Benner, The Justice Dept. Sues Texas Over Its New Restrictive Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 9,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/09/us/politics/texas-abortion-law-justice
-department-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/WEJ4-LJ9L].
15. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-19, at 446 (3d ed. 2000).
16. See infra Section II.A.
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We also reject an argument, which has been made by a number of leading
scholars and endorsed by others, that inconsistencies in the case law can be reconciled by positing a general right not to be subject to an invalid rule.17 While
we accept that some constitutional provisions provide universal rights against
enforcement of rules that are invalid in certain ways, we reject the valid rule hypothesis as an account of third-party standing. This hypothesis, we argue, is
both under and overinclusive as an account of third-party standing doctrine and
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s eﬀort in modern standing decisions to
reconcile public and private models of adjudication.
The second element of our approach unpacks true third-party standing
problems by distinguishing three classes of litigants:
1. Directly Regulated Parties: The litigant is directly regulated by the challenged law or conduct, but invokes rights held by others as the basis of their
challenge. The doctors in June Medical Services fell into this category because they
were regulated by the abortion law, but challenged it on the basis of their patients’ right to choose.18
2. Collaterally Injured Parties: The litigant is not the regulated entity, but the
challenged law or conduct causes the litigant injury in fact. The litigant challenges the law or conduct on the ground that it violates rights held by others.
Criminal defense lawyers challenging a state court’s refusal to appoint counsel
for indigent defendants furnish an example.19
3. Representative Parties: The litigant is a representative party who may or
may not have an injury in fact of their own, but seeks to redress injuries to others
as well. Many established mechanisms allow one party to stand in for others who
cannot litigate their own claims or are too numerous to litigate them eﬃciently.
Parents seeking to sue as “next friends” of their children fall into this category,20
as do class actions and other forms of representative and aggregate litigation.
The results in the Supreme Court’s third-party standing cases tend to track
these distinctions, but the Court’s explanations rarely acknowledge them. Unpacking these categories focuses attention on the questions peculiar to each, the
implications of which have yet to be fully considered by either courts or scholars.
Our goal is to identify more explicitly the tendencies in the case law, suggest
17.

See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235,
246-48 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1360-61 (2000); Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282 (1984); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 887 n.60 (2005) (“Scholars generally agree that the valid rule requirement is a basic constitutional principle.”).
18. See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2119.
19. See Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 134 (2004).
20. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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some friendly amendments, and consider how some of the problems lurking just
beneath the surface should be addressed. This unpacking, we contend, yields not
only greater doctrinal coherence, but also a better alignment of standing doctrine
with the constitutional and prudential functions that the doctrine is intended to
serve.21
Third-party standing is relevant to a wide range of constitutional litigation.
It arises, for example, when providers of goods or services seek to raise the rights
of their customers or clients—for example, in claims by sellers of beer and firearms,22 doctors prescribing contraceptives,23 criminal defense lawyers,24 and
homeowners seeking to sell to African American purchasers in violation of a restrictive covenant.25 Similar issues also lurk on the structural side of constitutional law. They emerge when individuals subject to government action invoke
the separation-of-powers prerogatives of particular government institutions—
such as the President’s removal authority26 or limitations on legislative vetoes27—or when particular persons or entities seek to represent the interests of
government institutions.28 Third-party issues likewise appear in federalism

21.

22.

23.
24.
25.

26.

27.

28.

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2015)
(urging scholars of standing to “attempt to identify how generally stated rules or principles
apply diﬀerently in coherently distinguishable contexts”).
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-97 (1976) (upholding third-party standing for a
beer vendor challenging an age restriction that discriminated as to gender); Md. Shall Issue,
Inc. v. Hogan, 971 F.3d 199, 216 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that a gun vendor “has third-party
standing . . . on behalf of potential customers”).
See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 45-46 (1943) (per curiam) (denying standing to a
doctor seeking to raise their patients’ right of access to contraceptives).
See, e.g., Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 134 (2004) (denying standing to lawyers seeking to be appointed
to represent indigent defendants).
See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-59 (1953) (holding that homeowners sued for selling
their home to an African American family in violation of a racial covenant could raise the
buyer’s equal-protection rights in defense).
See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2196 (2020) (holding
that persons subject to actions taken by an agency have standing to assert a separation-ofpowers challenge to the agency’s composition).
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935-36 (1983) (allowing an individual subject to a deportation order due to the operation of a legislative veto to challenge the practice on separation-ofpowers grounds).
See, e.g., Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) (holding that a single
house of the state legislature lacked standing to represent the entire legislature in defending
the legality of a district map); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 707-13 (2013) (holding
that proponents of a state constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriage lacked standing to assert the state’s right to defend that amendment on appeal); Bognet v. Sec’y of Pa.,
980 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that individuals lacked standing to litigate the prerogatives of a state legislature concerning the method of conducting an election).
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cases when individuals invoke limits on Congress’s enumerated authority29 or
states assert the rights of their citizens.30
Prior scholarship on third-party standing has focused on constitutional litigation. We suggest, however, that scholars should also pay attention to statutory
claims, which raise third-party standing issues of their own. Our third category
of third-party problems (involving representative parties) demonstrates, moreover, that important aspects of modern federal procedure, such as class actions,
multidistrict litigation (MDLs), and nationwide injunctions, can usefully be
seen as raising third-party standing issues.31 These issues of representation and
remedial scope have not generally been part of the conversation about thirdparty standing, but they should be—and some aspects of representative and aggregate litigation should be reconsidered in light of general concerns about
third-party standing.
Part I of this Article traces the relevant doctrines and their history—in particular, the clash between “private-rights” and “public-law” models of adjudication. We also address whether the third-party standing rule is best viewed as
constitutional or prudential in nature. Part II establishes the outer bounds of the
third-party problem by distinguishing those cases that actually involve firstparty claims. Once we have identified true third-party problems, Part III unpacks
them into three distinct categories. We show that the Supreme Court’s decisions
have, in fact, generally distinguished among these categories of cases, although
they have not always done so very clearly. The doctrine would work better and
be easier to justify theoretically if the Court made these distinctions explicit. Unpacking the doctrine into these categories, moreover, reveals aspects of the doctrine in need of reform, especially with respect to cases involving representative
parties.
i. situating third-party standing
Current standing doctrine insists on an “irreducible constitutional minimum” consisting of (1) an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.32 The injury

29.

See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 220 (2011) (holding that individuals have standing to raise enumerated powers challenges to federal statutes).
30. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)
(discussing states’ authority to raise their citizens’ rights as parens patriae).
31. See infra Section III.C.
32. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (first quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); and then citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)).
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must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical.”33 Even though the Supreme Court has endorsed these requirements in a number of decisions, they remain controversial, with many commentators questioning their historical support,34 intellectual coherence,35 and legal
(as opposed to political) grounding.36 Our aim here is not to reassess the basic
validity of this constitutional framework for standing. We accept it as a given for
our purposes, and we seek to better understand how the doctrine of third-party
standing does and should fit within that framework.
To that end, this Part begins by briefly describing the rise of modern standing doctrine. That historical account relates to our project in four ways. First, it
surfaces a clash between public and private models of adjudication that now underlies debates about third-party standing. Second, it shows that early discussions of third-party standing were driven by particular constitutional claims,
while the modern cases point to the need for a theory that also embraces statutory rights. Third, the recent history of standing doctrine demonstrates that
modern limits, while still controversial in theory, have not been all that constraining in practice. Debates about public adjudication have shifted to the problem of aggregating claims, and we seek to shift standing doctrine’s attention to
that problem as well. Finally, the history reveals how the political valence of
standing doctrine has changed over time—and may well change again.
We then assess the role of prudential rules and arguments in third-party
standing doctrine. With one narrow exception, we reject suggestions that the
third-party rule should either be elevated to constitutional status or, along with
all prudential rules, be abolished altogether.
A. The Rise of Modern Standing Doctrine
The Constitution does not mention “standing,” but the Supreme Court has
insisted that the principle is “rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or

33.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also, e.g., TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021)
(laying out the same injury-in-fact requirements).
34. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 222-23 (1992).
35. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 501-07 (2010).
36. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics? 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742 (1999).
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controversy” under Article III.37 That claim is controversial.38 Although the
Court occasionally acknowledged that standing had a constitutional aspect in the
nineteenth century, most of the cases it heard during that period focused on
whether the relevant common or statutory law provided the right kind of legal
right or entitlement to review.39
As Professor Sunstein has noted, the roots of modern standing doctrine
emerged as “part and parcel of the heated struggle, in the 1920s and 1930s,
within the country and the courts about the constitutional legitimacy of the
emerging regulatory state.”40 Progressives in that era pursued reform through
legislative and executive action; the courts, by contrast, had primarily intervened
to block progressive measures.41 Hence, in the 1930s, Justices like Louis Brandeis
and Felix Frankfurter led an eﬀort to tighten standing requirements for judicial
review of government action.42 By midcentury, parties wishing to challenge government action generally had two options. First, some statutes—such as the
Communications Act of 1934—provided a right to judicial review to persons “aggrieved or whose interests are adversely aﬀected” by particular kinds of government action.43 Plaintiﬀs suing under these statutes were not required to allege
an invasion of a legal right and could assert the public’s general interest in requiring government compliance with the law.44 Second, absent such a statutory
37.

38.

39.

40.
41.
42.

43.
44.

10

Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547; see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(explaining that Article III’s terms “have virtually no meaning except by reference” to the “traditional, fundamental limitations upon the powers of common-law courts”).
Compare James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable Interests, and Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 204-12 (2018) (arguing that contemporary standing jurisprudence does not reflect understandings in the Founding Era), and John A. Ferejohn & Larry D.
Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 962, 1004 (2002) (asserting that “no one seriously believes that the Framers chose
[the words ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’] with anything like the Supreme Court’s doctrinal
framework in mind”), with Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine? 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 732 (2004) (“[S]tanding doctrine has a far longer history
than its modern critics concede.”).
See generally Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 38, at 712-18 (describing nineteenth-century
standing law); Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131,
1136-39 (2009) (describing the legal-wrong test).
Sunstein, supra note 34, at 179.
See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical
Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591 (2010).
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(b)(2), 48 Stat. 1064, 1093 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (2018)).
See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940); Magill, supra note 39, at
1139-41.
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provision, parties could seek review of government action only if government
oﬃcers had committed “‘an invasion of recognized legal rights’ (or legally protected interests) that the law conferred upon the plaintiﬀ in particular.”45
The political valence of standing soon changed, however. After 1940, liberals
tended to favor broad standing and conservatives tended to oppose it.46 Professor Ho and Erica Ross have suggested several reasons for this shift: a sense that
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its judicial review provisions (enacted in 1946) could help block eﬀorts to roll back the administrative state; a
shift in the focus of judicial review from agency action to other issues, such as
the Warren Court’s expansion of individual rights; and, by the 1960s, the enactment of statutory citizen-suit provisions and the emergence of a public-interest
bar that made litigation an attractive alternative to political action as a reform
strategy.47 Reformers who had once defended administrative discretion also began to worry about agency capture by regulated industries; they thus embraced
public-law litigation as a way of forcing recalcitrant administrators to implement
statutory mandates.48
Progressives in the 1960s and 1970s thus advanced a broad “public-rights”
model of adjudication.49 That model emphasized that, as Professor Jaﬀe put it,
“those judges who do have qualities of leadership may have the opportunity of
solving a problem which other responsible lawmaking bodies have not been able
to solve, often because of the obstruction of minorities or the indiﬀerence of the
citizenry.”50 The centerpiece of the public-rights model was the “public action,”
which would permit plaintiﬀs to assert “broad and diﬀuse interests—such as
those of consumers or users of the ‘environment’—which do not involve the litigants’ individual status.”51 Congress seemed to endorse this model by enacting
broad “citizen suit” provisions in statutes like the Clean Air Act and the Consumer Product Safety Act.52 Writing in 1973, Professor Monaghan asserted that

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.

Caleb Nelson, “Standing” and Remedial Rights in Administrative Law, 105 VA. L. REV. 703, 716
(2019) (quoting Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940)).
Ho & Ross, supra note 42, at 632.
See id. at 645-47.
See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 183-84.
See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976).
Louis L. Jaﬀe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiﬀ, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1968).
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1369
(1973); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 281-318 (1990) (describing and defending the public-rights model).
See Magill, supra note 39, at 1186-89.
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“[t]he ‘public’ action . . . has fully surfaced.”53 Considering Justice Frankfurter’s
suggestion that “no ‘case or controversy’ existed where the substantive assertion
is simply that ‘the frame of government is askew,’” Monaghan asked simply,
“why not?”54
The Supreme Court, however, never fully embraced the public action.55 In
1970, in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,56 the Court
broadened standing by replacing the old “legal interest” test with the more permissive “zone-of-interest” formula.57 But Data Processing required not only an
invocation of a statutory or constitutional right, but also an “injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”58 That requirement rejected the public action’s premise that
any concerned citizen could vindicate the public interest in government legality,
demanding instead that some concrete harm set the plaintiﬀ apart as particularly
aﬀected. Likewise, two years after Data Processing, the Court in Sierra Club v.
Morton rejected the notion that a public-interest organization may litigate a public-law question based simply on its longstanding interest and expertise in the
subject area.59 Despite the changing legal landscape around it, the Court thus

53.

54.
55.

56.
57.

58.

59.
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Monaghan, supra note 51, at 1369.
Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 299 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.
454 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1982) (“This Court repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated
on ‘the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law.’” (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 208)); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (“The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries.”).
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
See id. at 154 (emphasizing that “[w]here statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative action”); see also Magill, supra note
39, at 1162-63 (noting that Data Processing liberalized standing); Kenneth Culp Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 450, 452-53 (1970) (same). For an example
of the more restrictive prior test, see Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
306 U.S. 118, 137-39 (1939), which held that competing power companies lacked the ability to
challenge the constitutionality of the Tennessee Valley Authority because they had no “legal
right” to be free from competition.
Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152; see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public
Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1154 (1993) (“The injury in fact test was designed to simplify
and liberalize the standing inquiry” by making “[l]ayman’s injury . . . rather than legal or
‘lawyer’s’ injury . . . the linchpin.”).
405 U.S. 727, 738-40 (1972).
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held onto at least the conceptual form of an older “private-rights” model of adjudication.60 In doing so, the Court insisted that even public-law litigation must
retain the basic elements of a traditional dispute between private litigants, asserting interests personal to them.61
Modern standing doctrine crystallized in the two decades between Data Processing in 1970 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife in 1992. Lujan was a suit brought
under the broad citizen-suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act by environmentalists concerned about the impact of federal aid to foreign construction
projects aﬀecting threatened species.62 The decision was the first to employ constitutional standing principles to limit an act of Congress conferring broad public rights to sue, and it became a lightning rod for criticism of the Court’s “new”
doctrine. Critics charged, among other things, that Lujan intruded on Congress’s
authority and was likely to unduly constrict modern public-law litigation.63 But
all the elements of the Court’s doctrine, including designation of injury in fact as
a “minimum constitutional mandate” and recognition of various additional prudential rules, had already appeared in earlier decisions such as Warth v. Seldin64
and Allen v. Wright.65 Cases in this period also married traditional separation-ofpowers concerns about confining adjudication to a traditional conception of the
judicial power with a newer concern about protecting the enforcement discretion
of the Executive.66
The Court’s eﬀorts to maintain contact with the old private-rights model
have proven less restrictive than its early critics predicted. Post-Lujan decisions
have made clear, both implicitly and explicitly, that the invasion of intangible
interests unknown to the common law can suﬃce for injury in fact.67 Nor has
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.

See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 73-76 (7th ed. 2015)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
See id. at 73-74.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 58, at 1142; Sunstein, supra note 34, at 164-65.
422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975).
468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77; Allen, 468 U.S. at 761; see also Tara Leigh Grove, Standing
as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 J. CONST. L. 781, 783 (2009) (arguing that limits on
standing help enforce an Article II nondelegation principle “by curtailing private prosecutorial
discretion”).
See, e.g., TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204-05 (2021) (“Various intangible
harms can also be concrete.”); Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Although
tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous
cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 755
(“There can be no doubt that this sort of noneconomic injury [arising from racial stigma] is
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the Court’s insistence that plaintiﬀs allege something giving them a closer connection than most persons to the challenged action proven much of an obstacle.
Lujan, for example, suggested that the environmentalist plaintiﬀs might have
prevailed if they had purchased plane tickets to visit the endangered animals at
a particular future time.68 Likewise, the Court in Sierra Club v. Morton69 insisted
that the plaintiﬀ Sierra Club could not challenge federal proposals for development in the Sequoia National Forest without identifying at least one particular
member who had visited the forest, but that this posed no serious impediment
to litigation.70 In FEC v. Akins,71 the Court upheld a very broad citizen-suit provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act, notwithstanding that the plaintiﬀ ’s
alleged injury (denial of information relevant to a voting decision) was very
widely shared. And just this past Term, the Court approved rights violations involving only nominal damages as suﬃcient to establish standing for litigants
seeking to establish the unlawfulness of government conduct.72 These holdings
suggest that the Court has gone to considerable lengths to reconcile the two
competing models of adjudication, rather than simply choosing one over the
other.73
Although the modern doctrinal framework, and particularly the injury-infact requirement, remains controversial among commentators,74 it is well entrenched in the courts. In recent years, all the Justices have appeared to accept
the basic standing framework, although they sometimes disagree on how to apply it.75 The more interesting questions to our minds thus concern the ways in

68.

69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.

75.
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one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government action and is suﬃcient
in some circumstances to support standing.”).
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563-64; see also id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
acquisition of airline tickets to visit the sites in question would have been enough to establish
standing).
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
See id. at 735 n.8 (noting that an amicus brief filed by another group had asserted that the
Sierra Club had many members who regularly visited the Mineral King Valley and would be
aﬀected by the challenged government policy, but that the Club had expressly declined to rely
on injuries to those specific members).
524 U.S. 11 (1998).
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021).
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 75.
See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
275, 299-306 (2008); Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty
Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 176-79 (2012); Sunstein, supra note 34, at 185-86.
See, e.g., Uzuegbunam, 141 S. Ct. at 797; id. at 803-07 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the majority’s application of the redressability requirement to claims for nominal damages); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1554-55 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
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which the old controversy over the public action continues to influence open
doctrinal questions within the modern framework. Four central observations are
important to the remainder of this Article.
First, third-party standing doctrine sits at the heart of these debates because
it follows directly after questions concerning the scope of first-party rights.
There are, in other words, two ways to approximate the “public action” advocated by proponents of broad public-law litigation. One can define first-party
rights broadly by conferring rights on anyone who becomes aware of a violation
of law, or one can broadly authorize litigants to raise the rights of a more narrow
class of persons with first-party rights at stake.76 Professors Monaghan and Fallon, for example—both critics of the private-rights model of adjudication—have
also both embraced broadly permissive approaches to third-party standing.77
This is evident in their support of a broad “valid rule” basis for asserting standing, an approach that we criticize below. Conversely, the separation-of-powers
arguments that have traditionally constrained the public action also counsel
against broad exceptions to the rule against asserting third-party rights. That
point becomes especially relevant, as we will explain, in cases involving parties
who claim mere collateral injuries from the violation of third-party rights.78
Second, the academic literature on standing has reflected the shifting salience
of diﬀerent constitutional claims over time, and those trends have shaped how
scholars think about third-party standing. Much of the early commentary on
standing focused on First Amendment overbreadth challenges and the related
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges.79 Later entries reflected the
emergence of structural claims about federalism and separation of powers as preoccupations of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.80 But the central modern

76.

77.
78.
79.
80.

(accepting the legal framework of the Court’s standing analysis and disagreeing only as to
whether a remand was necessary to determine the adequacy of the plaintiﬀ ’s allegations).
See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 51, at 314-18; see also TRIBE, supra note 15, § 3-19, at 443 (stating
that a litigant asserting third-party standing “is essentially asking to be treated as a ‘private
attorney general’”).
See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1364-67; Monaghan, supra note 17, at 282.
See infra Section III.B.
See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4; Fallon, supra note 17,
1360-61.
See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1448-80,
1480-1520 (2013). These structural cases often featured institutional litigants, and thus the
rights of these institutions to sue became part of the structural debate. See, e.g., Tara Leigh
Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of Institutional Injury, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 611, 61718 (2019).
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standing cases, including Data Processing, Lujan, Akins, and Spokeo, have demonstrated the importance of statutory claims.81 In the next Part, we seek to develop
a framework in which statutory claims are not an afterthought to constitutional
ones.
Third, experience with public-law litigation has demonstrated that it is generally not diﬃcult to find a plaintiﬀ who is more directly aﬀected by the challenged action than most.82 Debate has thus shifted to other aspects of the public
action. In particular, as we discuss in Section III.C, attention outside of constitutional law has focused on various methods for aggregating the claims and interests of diﬀuse right holders, including class actions, MDLs, actions by membership organizations, and nationwide injunctions.83 Many of these
representative mechanisms are actually instances of third-party standing and
thus need to be considered alongside, and integrated into, any satisfactory account of the third-party problem.84
Finally, the shifting ideological valence of standing doctrine over time
demonstrates that relationships between theories of judicial review and models
of adjudication, on the one hand, and substantive political commitments, on the
other, are highly contingent. Competing models of standing have had diﬀerent
political valences in diﬀerent eras, and in the present era of both left- and rightwing public litigation, they have no clear valence at all.85 Third-party standing
cases range across the political spectrum, from abortion rights, to gun rights, to
economic regulation, to election disputes, to race relations. Judges or litigants
deciding whether to frame standing rules broadly or narrowly would not want

81.

82.

83.

84.

85.
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For a very recent example, see TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), which addresses which members of a broad plaintiﬀ class had the requisite Article III injury in fact to
pursue claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and in the judgment) (describing the “minimal requirements” of Article III); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 & n.15 (1972) (emphasizing that requirements of injury to individuals would not foreclose litigation).
See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, MDL Revolution, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2021); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, ClassWide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872 (2006).
Cf. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 146 (2011) (“In an era of frequent
litigation, class actions, sweeping injunctions with prospective eﬀect, and continuing jurisdiction to enforce judicial remedies, courts must be more careful to insist on the formal rules of
standing, not less so.”).
See, e.g., California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021) (rejecting Texas’s challenge to the Aﬀordable Care Act on standing grounds); Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law
Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 45-47 (2018) (noting extensive publiclaw litigation by both red states and blue states).
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to place any large bets on whether the resulting precedent would benefit particular political causes or partisan worldviews over the long term. This predictive
diﬃculty should encourage both courts and commentators to think about standing on its own terms, and to pay less attention to the expected political consequences of particular approaches.86
B. Prudential or Constitutional?
Beyond the Article III requirements for standing, the Supreme Court has also
recognized a distinct category of prudential requirements grounded in the judiciary’s own power of “self-governance.”87 The rule against third-party standing
has traditionally been the most important of these rules. Other prudential principles have barred parties from asserting “generalized grievances” and required
them to be in the zone of interests of the substantive law on which they rely.88 In
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., however, the Court
questioned the very notion of prudential standing limits.89 That decision moved
the zone-of-interest requirement out of the standing category altogether, and it
suggested that the rule against generalized grievances stems from Article III.90
But the Court acknowledged that the third-party rule was “harder to classify”;
“consideration of that doctrine’s proper place in the standing firmament,” the
Court concluded, “can await another day.”91
In June Medical Services, all but one of the Justices seemed content to leave
the third-party standing rule in the prudential category. The plurality reasoned
that the third-party rule “is ‘prudential,’” “does not involve the Constitution’s

86.

87.

88.
89.

90.
91.

Cf. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1964) (insisting that Article III principles, like other constitutional principles, must be developed and applied in a principled
way).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1975); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)
(explaining that, in addition to “a core component derived directly from the Constitution,”
“[s]tanding doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits”); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (describing prudential doctrines as “complementary rule[s] of selfrestraint” that the Court has “developed . . . for its own governance”).
See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-501.
See 572 U.S. 118, 125-26 (2014); see also S. Todd Brown, The Story of Prudential Standing, 42
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 99 (2014) (proposing “the total dismantling of the prudential
branch of standing”); Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doctrine Abolished or Waiting for
a Comeback?: Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18 U. PA. J. CON.
L. 213, 225-27 (2015) (discussing the history of criticisms of prudential standing doctrine leading up to Lexmark).
See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 127 & n.3.
Id. at 127-28 & n.3.
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‘case-or-controversy requirement,’” and therefore “can be forfeited or waived.”92
Only Justice Thomas disagreed.93 Subject to one qualification that we note below, we conclude here that categorizing the limits on third-party standing as
prudential makes sense. This Section also clarifies the function of prudential reasoning in standing doctrine and the extent to which the Lexmark decision called
such reasoning into question.
One confusing aspect of the terminology should be noted at the outset. “Prudential” may refer both to the status and provenance of a rule, on the one hand,
and to the underlying rationale oﬀered in a rule’s support, on the other. The most
frequently remarked diﬀerence between rules enjoying constitutional and prudential status is that Congress may override the latter by conferring statutory
rights to sue on particular parties.94 Prudential limitations also appear to be subject to party waiver, whereas Article III limitations are not.95 Relatedly, some (but
not all) courts of appeal have held prudential standing rules to be nonjurisdictional.96 Finally, courts sometimes set the prudential rules aside in particular
cases for reasons of eﬃciency—for example, if the third-party standing issue has
developed only late in the litigation.97
The arguments invoked in support of standing rules are also often prudential
in nature. This fact, however, does not by itself distinguish these rules from constitutional limits on standing. Although the Court grounds the latter in a formal
conception of separated powers,98 that conception shades very quickly into notions of “the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic

92.

93.
94.

95.
96.
97.

98.
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June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2117 (2020) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 2144 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975). Such legislation may also aﬀect the application
of the constitutional requirements for standing by creating interests, the invasion of which
may produce constitutional injury in fact, but statutes may not eliminate Article III’s “irreducible minimum” altogether. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (upholding broad individual
standing under the Federal Election Campaign Act by construing the Act to create a right to
information, the denial of which constituted a constitutional injury in fact).
See, e.g., June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2117; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1976).
See generally Bradford C. Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, 64 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
413 (2013) (collecting decisions).
See Craig, 429 U.S. at 193 (noting that the prudential objectives of the third-party standing
doctrine “cannot be furthered here, where the lower court already has entertained the relevant
constitutional challenge”).
See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“The law of Article III
standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”).
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society.”99 Likewise, as Professor Fallon has noted, “[j]usticiability doctrines reveal a deep, systemic antipathy to judicial coercion that is unnecessary to protect
rights actually in danger.”100 And in constitutional cases, “[e]qually established
policies urge courts to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking.”101 All
of these ideas are recognizable as prudential forms of argument.102
Another set of prudential arguments focuses on judicial craft rather than decisional consequences or legitimacy. Standing doctrine, like other justiciability
requirements of ripeness and mootness, seeks to ensure that litigation maintains
the “functional requisites of informed adjudication” necessary for courts to do
their job.103 Professor Fallon has explained that “[a] specific and concrete injury
helps frame issues in a factual context suitable for judicial resolution,” limits “the
scope of a judicial decision,” and promotes the “adverse interests and arguments
[that] sharpen ‘the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of diﬃcult constitutional questions.’”104 Although these
pragmatic values are often associated primarily with prudential standing rules,
the Court also invokes them in support of constitutional requirements.105
The Court has justified the third-party standing rule in terms of both these
pragmatic decisional concerns as well as broader notions of the judicial role in
the separation of powers. The rule “assures the court that the issues before it will
be concrete and sharply presented.”106 It “assumes that the party with the right

99.

100.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

106.

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498); see also Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996) (noting standing doctrine’s “separation-of-powers component, which keeps courts within certain traditional bounds vis-à-vis the other branches,
concrete adverseness or not”).
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (1984); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803) (acknowledging that “any legal investigation of the acts of [executive] oﬃcers [is] peculiarly irksome,” and that “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide
on the rights of individuals”).
Fallon, supra note 100, at 29; see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (cataloguing doctrines of constitutional avoidance).
See Neil S. Siegel, Prudentialism in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 6 DUKE. J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 16 (2010) (developing two broad conceptions of prudential argument).
See Fallon, supra note 100, at 13-14.
Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (“The requirement of ‘actual injury redressable by the
court’ . . . tends to assure that the legal questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the
rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.” (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976))).
Sec’y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984).
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has the appropriate incentive to challenge (or not challenge) governmental action and to do so with the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation.”107 And
the Court has worried that without the third-party rule, “courts would be called
upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other
governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and
even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
rights.”108 One cannot classify the third-party rule as prudential or constitutional
based on the type of arguments employed to justify it; rather, it rests on arguments similar to those supporting other aspects of standing.109
The crucial consideration for classifying the third-party standing rule as constitutional or prudential, we contend, is the relationship between that rule and
the “irreducible constitutional minimum”110 of injury in fact. In evaluating this
relationship, it is important to keep in mind that parties must meet standing
requirements not only to initiate a lawsuit, but also to seek particular remedies,
assert particular defenses, or appeal adverse rulings.111 Sometimes parties have
standing to take some actions in a case but not others; for instance, a party may
have standing to contest certain procedural or jurisdictional questions even if
they lack standing to assert their underlying claims on the merits.112 The key
point—often overlooked—is that standing principles may limit the assertion of

107.

108.
109.

110.
111.

112.
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Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
See Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 955 n.5 (observing that the third-party rule’s rationale
“is not completely separable from Art. III’s requirement that a plaintiﬀ have a ‘suﬃciently
concrete interest in the outcome of [the] suit to make it a case or controversy’” (quoting Singleton v. Wulﬀ, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976))).
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000);
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983); see also Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests.,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) (holding that an intervenor in a suit must satisfy Article III standing requirements in order to pursue relief diﬀerent from that sought by a party); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013)) (“[S]tanding ‘must be met by persons seeking
appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.’”
(quoting Arizonans for Oﬀ. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997))).
See Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Admins. of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 76-78 (1991)
(holding that state-court plaintiﬀs had standing to contest the removal of their claims to federal court whether or not they had Article III standing to pursue their claims on the merits);
U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980) (holding that a named plaintiﬀ in
a class action whose substantive claim has become moot retains standing to litigate the denial
of class certification).
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particular claims or defenses even if a party otherwise has standing to participate
in the case.113
The third-party rule is particularly likely to come up in two circumstances in
which Article III injury in fact is not in question. A plaintiﬀ with a clear injury
to his or her own interests may nonetheless wish to construct a more eﬀective
legal claim by raising the rights of others. As we discuss in Part II, the doctors in
June Medical Services are one example.114 Or a defendant in a lawsuit—in which
the plaintiﬀ has already established the injury requisite to an Article III case or
controversy—may wish to assert a third party’s rights as a defense.115 In many
third-party standing cases, the crucial question is not whether a party may participate at all, but rather what claims or defenses it may assert.116 That question
is a function of the underlying law, which may be constitutional, statutory, or
common law depending on the claim, as well as of prudential considerations
about the functional requisites of adjudication. But it will not ordinarily implicate Article III.
Once we understand standing as implicating the claims or defenses a party
may raise rather than their right to initiate litigation, the third-party standing
doctrine’s prudential status becomes easier to understand.117 If a party has an
injury in fact caused by the defendant’s action and redressable by the requested
relief, then we have a “case or controversy” and the federal court may constitutionally hear the dispute. Other considerations—particularly those meant to ensure that issues are teed up for the court by parties who can adequately present
them—have been treated more flexibly under the prudential label.118
This understanding of the third-party rule suggests, however, that some
third-party claims do raise constitutional as well as prudential questions. As we
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See Int’l Primate Prot. League, 500 U.S. at 77 (“Standing does not refer simply to a party’s capacity to appear in court. Rather, standing is gauged by the specific common-law, statutory
or constitutional claims that a party presents.”).
See June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2117 (2020).
See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (involving a criminal defendant seeking
to exclude evidence based on an illegal search of another person’s premises or property).
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 n.12 (1975) (explaining that “there is no Art.
III standing problem” when “the litigant asserts the rights of third parties defensively, as a bar
to judgment against him,” but that prudential considerations may nonetheless limit the litigants’ ability to invoke the rights of third parties (first citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953), and then citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961))).
See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 n.12.
See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 757-59 (2013) (holding that the rule requiring
adverse parties was prudential in nature, and that the government’s refusal to provide the
requested relief was suﬃcient to preserve an Article III “case or controversy” despite the government’s agreement with the plaintiﬀ ’s claim).
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discuss further in Section III.C, our last category of third-party problems involves cases in which one party is allowed to “represent” another and rely not
only on that third-party’s rights but also on its injury in fact. When one person
sues on behalf of another as a “next friend,” for example, the person initiating
the litigation often claims neither rights nor injury of their own. Likewise, a
membership organization suing on behalf of its members ordinarily asserts injury to one or more members, not to itself. Because the plaintiﬀ in these situations asserts no injury in fact of its own,119 the third-party standing rules governing such suits plainly raise constitutional as well as prudential concerns.
In his dissent in June Medical Services, Justice Thomas disputed the prudential status of the third-party standing rule for a diﬀerent reason. He argued that,
under the common law, even when plaintiﬀs had an injury in fact, they were still
required to allege a “legally protected interest,” and he contended that this common law requirement is necessary for an Article III “case or controversy.”120
Scholars have disagreed sharply about whether these common-law limitations
were understood historically as Article III requirements.121 The ambiguity of the
early cases is understandable because the constitutional status of such requirements did not really matter until Congress started to incorporate broad citizensuit provisions into federal regulatory statutes in the 1970s.122 In any event, the
Court clearly held in Data Processing that the legal-interest test (understood as
whether the plaintiﬀ has a valid cause of action) “goes to the merits,”123 thus
119.
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Sometimes these representational plaintiﬀs do assert their own injuries. Parents suing as next
friends of their children, for example, may assert their own interest in associating with the
child or in controlling the child’s upbringing. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow,
542 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). Likewise, membership organizations sometimes assert direct harms to
their own institutional interests. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 37879 (1982). Those injuries will generally satisfy Article III, leaving only prudential concerns
about raising third-party rights. But under current doctrine, representational standing does
not depend on the existence of these first-party injuries, and many next friends or organizations will not have them.
See June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2143-46 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas maintained that when there is a legally protected interest, an injury in fact is
required for standing only when the litigant was asserting public rights, not private rights.
See id. at 2145-46; see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2217-19 (2021)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (making a similar argument).
See sources cited supra notes 38-39.
Justice Thomas cited, for example, Clark v. City of Kansas City, which held that “[a] court will
not listen to an objection made to the constitutionality of an act by a party whose rights it
does not aﬀect and who has therefore no interest in defeating it.” 176 U.S. 114, 118 (1900)
(citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 196 (6th ed. 1890)). But neither
“standing” nor “Article III” appears in the opinion. See also Lea, supra note 6, at 291-94 (arguing that Clark should not be read as applying a categorical bar against asserting third-party
rights).
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
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excluding it as a requirement—constitutional or otherwise—of standing. Just as
it is not our project in this Article to question the validity of the modern Court’s
constitutional injury-in-fact requirement, it is likewise outside our scope to consider whether the Data Processing framework should be replaced with something
else. We seek to make the best sense we can out of the Court’s third-party standing decisions within the broad framework laid out by Data Processing, Lujan, and
their progeny.
Justice Thomas also suggested that the third-party rule cannot be prudential
because, in his view, Lexmark rejected prudential standing generally.124 The
Court in Lexmark, however, specifically reserved judgment on the third-party
standing rule,125 and lower courts have not interpreted the decision as aﬀecting
the prudential status of that rule.126 Nor, as noted above, did the majority appear
to interpret Lexmark that way in June Medical Services. More broadly, prudential
doctrines limiting the powers of the federal courts pervade the field of federal
jurisdiction, from the act-of-state doctrine127 to Younger abstention.128 Much of
ripeness and mootness doctrine, which are inextricably linked to standing by a
common focus on the presence and persistence of an injury in fact, is widely
acknowledged to be prudential.129 Other examples include doctrines recognizing
124.
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See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2143-44 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Commentators have likewise read Lexmark as signaling a general rejection of prudential rules. See, e.g., Joel S. Nolette,
Last Stand for Prudential Standing? Lexmark and Its Implications, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227,
232-33 (2018) (“For good reason, courts and commentators in the wake of Lexmark have read
the decision as heralding the end of prudential standing, third-party standing included. The
Court, too, has hinted at as much.”); id. at 233 n. 43 (citing, inter alia, Susan B. Anthony List
v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014) (questioning “the continuing vitality of the prudential
ripeness doctrine”)); Leading Case, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 128 HARV. L. REV. 321, 328 (2014) (“Lexmark has abruptly upended prudential
standing doctrine.”); Brown, supra note 89, at 132 (similar).
See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 n.3 (2014).
See, e.g., Hill v. Warsewa, 947 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 2020); Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109, 1118 n.9 (9th Cir. 2015).
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Ernest A. Young, The
Story of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: Federal Judicial Power in Foreign Relations Cases,
in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 415, 434-38 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010) (analogizing the act-of-state doctrine to other prudential rules limiting federal judicial power).
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971) (limiting federal courts’ power to enjoin state
criminal proceedings in order to protect comity and federalism). See generally David L.
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985) (documenting how “discretion [in the exercise of federal court jurisdiction] is much more pervasive than is generally
realized, and . . . has ancient and honorable roots at common law as well as in equity”).
See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 341 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Chief
Justice Rehnquist that “the ‘yet evading review’ portion of our ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ test [for overcoming mootness] is prudential” (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.
478, 482 (1982)); Shapiro, supra note 128, at 553-54.
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courts’ prudential discretion not to grant equitable relief,130 the forum non conveniens doctrine,131 the Supreme Court’s prudential discretion to decline to exercise its original jurisdiction,132 and arguably the current interpretation of the
general federal-question statute.133 Regardless of whether such prudential doctrines are justified as “constitutional common law,”134 exercises of the federal
courts’ inherent power over procedure in cases before them,135 or as interpretations of statutory or equitable limits on judicial power,136 we seriously doubt that
Lexmark ruled out all such prudential limitations.137
In any event, the Court’s core objection in Lexmark to prudential standing
limits—that federal courts have a “virtually unflagging” obligation to hear cases
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See Shapiro, supra note 128, at 548-50.
See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); Shapiro, supra note 128, at 555-57.
See, e.g., Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 76 (1992) (noting the Court’s discretionary
power to decline to exercise its original jurisdiction); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401
U.S. 493, 498 (1971) (same). But see Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of motion for leave to file an original complaint) (criticizing the Court’s discretionary policy along lines similar to Justice Scalia’s reasoning in
Lexmark).
See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)
(permitting federal “arising-under” jurisdiction over federal elements in state causes of action
when the federal issue is “actually disputed and substantial,” and “a federal forum may entertain [it] without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities”); Shapiro, supra note 128, at 566-70 (characterizing this sort of approach as
an exercise of prudential discretion).
See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975).
See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
324, 325 (2006); Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1434
(1984).
See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins., 517 U.S. 706, 717-19 (1996) (grounding the various
abstention doctrines in the courts’ equitable discretion); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 148-54 (1967) (grounding much of ripeness doctrine not in Article III but in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Declaratory Judgment Act and in limits on the courts’ equitable powers).
We do not mean to endorse every one of these prudential doctrines; our point is simply that
at least some of them are probably here to stay. For an argument that eﬀorts to eliminate
prudential limits on the exercise of jurisdiction tend to result in the recategorization of these
limits as part of substantive law, including constitutional law, and that this is problematic
from the perspective of representative democracy, see Fred O. Smith, Jr., Undemocratic Restraint, 70 VAND. L. REV. 845 (2017). We suspect, however, that reports of the death of prudential doctrines (by recategorization or otherwise) are exaggerated.
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within their jurisdiction138—has little application to the third-party rule.139 That
rule, after all, does not deny that courts may (and perhaps must) hear cases before them when the plaintiﬀ has a concrete injury in fact. Rather, the third-party
rule restricts the arguments that such a plaintiﬀ (or other parties) can raise. To
our knowledge, no one thinks that a court with jurisdiction over a case has an
“unflagging” obligation to hear every possible argument that a litigant might
raise. If the doctors in June Medical Services had been prosecuted under Louisiana
law, and a court had refused to allow them to raise their patients’ rights as a
constitutional defense, we doubt that anyone would have seen that decision as a
refusal to exercise jurisdiction. Likewise, when a court dismisses a plaintiﬀ ’s lawsuit on the ground that the plaintiﬀ lacks third-party standing to raise the claim
upon which the suit depends, that court is exercising its jurisdiction, not withholding it.
For these reasons, Lexmark should not be understood as fundamentally
changing the law with respect to third-party standing. It should cast no doubt
on either the validity of the third-party standing rule or its generally prudential
status. Nevertheless, Lexmark is relevant to our eﬀort to unpack third-party
standing. As the next Part shows, considerations of the scope of rights that lay at
Lexmark’s heart—and which the Court rightly identified with the substantive law
underlying a lawsuit—play a crucial role in defining the bounds of the thirdparty problem.
ii. who is a right holder? third-party versus first-party
claims
Third-party standing problems arise only if and to the extent that a litigant
cannot rely on his or her own (first-party) rights. For example, the doctors in
June Medical Services could have asserted their own rights not to be regulated in
a wholly arbitrary manner and, possibly, their rights to practice medicine.140 Alternatively, they might have asserted equal-protection claims if they believed that
138.

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014) (quoting
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013)).
139. Ironically, the Court derived the proposition that federal courts’ obligation to exercise their
jurisdiction is “virtually unflagging” from Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States—a case recognizing a notoriously discretionary prudential abstention doctrine. 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976); see Shapiro, supra note 128, at 545.
140. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)) (noting that due
process “would bar statutory impositions even at relatively trivial levels when governmental
restraints are undeniably irrational”); Singleton v. Wulﬀ, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (plurality
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they were regulated more strictly than other sorts of doctors without adequate
justification.141 But none of these claims was likely to win on the merits; understandably, the doctors wanted to assert the more fundamental rights of their patients to choose an abortion. To the extent that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence confers rights only on pregnant women, not their doctors, we take the
doctors’ claim to be a classic form of third-party standing.
The law of standing encompasses two distinct sets of questions: who has the
right to invoke the power of a court (by filing a lawsuit, for example, or taking
an appeal), and what arguments or legal principles a party can raise as a claim or
defense. Article III standing doctrine addresses the former; third-party standing
usually concerns the latter. And as June Medical Services illustrates, the boundaries of first-party rights turn out to be crucial in determining litigants’ need to
assert rights held by other parties. That means that notwithstanding our ultimate focus on third-party standing, we initially must consider when litigants
have first-party rights.
Courts and commentators widely acknowledge that the rights a litigant can
assert depend on the nature and scope of the underlying law,142 but ambiguity
remains concerning the appropriate framework for translating substance into
standing. We locate the answer in the familiar “zone-of-interests” concept. Two
decades ago, Professor Tribe recognized that “to say that a particular plaintiﬀ ’s
claim does not fall within the zone of interests of a given constitutional provision
is another way of saying that the right claimed is one possessed not by the party
asserting it, but rather by others.”143 His insight linking the zone-of-interests
concept with the issue of first-party versus third-party rights has been largely
ignored since. We suggest that it is a missing piece of the doctrinal puzzle. Litigants within the zone of interests of a statute or constitutional provision may
invoke their own rights; others must rely, if they can, on third-party standing.

opinion) (“The Court of Appeals adverted to what it perceived to be the doctor’s own ‘constitutional rights to practice medicine.’ . . . We have no occasion to decide whether such rights
exist. Assuming that they do, the doctors, of course, can assert them.”).
141. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447-48 (1985) (holding that the
government may not regulate similarly situated parties diﬀerently absent a rational basis for
doing so).
142. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (acknowledging that standing “often turns on
the nature and source of the claim asserted”); Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 428 (1974) (“Standing,
in looking to injury or recognizable harm, quite obviously deals with an essential element of
a claim.”); David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 47 (making a
similar point); Fletcher, supra note 6, at 223 (arguing more broadly that “standing should
simply be a question on the merits of plaintiﬀ ’s claim”).
143. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 3-19, at 446.
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The Court’s Lexmark decision dominates contemporary discussions of the
zone of interests, but that decision’s significance is often misunderstood. Although Lexmark rejected the zone of interests as a freestanding doctrine of prudential standing, it also made clear that the zone of interests “always applies” in
construing the scope of legal rights.144 The concept thus remains, in our view,
crucial to framing the boundaries of the third-party standing problem. In the
course of explaining its usefulness, we reject two other ways of framing that
problem. First, courts and commentators have sometimes suggested that firstparty rights should be limited to those who have a private right of action. And
second, several prominent scholars have endorsed an approach that turns most
third-party problems into first-party claims by postulating a right to be judged
by a valid rule of law. Although both approaches may be useful in particular contexts, neither provides a general organizing principle for third-party standing
cases.
We begin with statutory rights, because the zone-of-interests approach is
most developed there. We then turn to constitutional rights. The final section
addresses the valid rule argument.
A. The Scope of Statutory Rights
Eﬀorts to invoke the constitutional rights of third parties have received the
lion’s share of academic attention, but most litigation involves statutory or common-law claims. In these latter settings, it seems quite natural to acknowledge
that the underlying law shapes who has a first-party right to invoke a statutory
or common-law principle. But this is just the beginning of the inquiry. Congress
is often unclear as to the scope of statutory rights, and the common law is often
no clearer.145 The widely used zone-of-interests test exists alongside other more
field-specific doctrines of statutory standing. And confusion has long existed
concerning the relationship between a statute’s zone of interests and whether the
plaintiﬀ has a “cause of action.”146 Defining the circumstances in which litigants

144.

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014).
145. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third-Party Beneficiaries and Contractual Networks,
7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 330 (2015) (observing that “courts have not clarified the factors that
do and should generate the conclusion” that someone is a third-party beneficiary to a contract).
146. Compare STEPHEN BREYER & RICHARD STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES (2d ed. 1985) (tending to equate the two), and Lee A. Albert,
Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1139, 114454 (1977) (same), with Fletcher, supra note 6, at 236 (“‘[C]ause of action’ is an awkward term
because it includes within its scope the two distinct questions of defendant’s duty and plaintiﬀ ’s right to enforce that duty.”).
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must rely on third-party rights requires some initial eﬀort to clean up the “largely
unexplored” law of statutory standing.147
Standing to invoke a statutory right, we contend, concerns simply whether
a litigant has first-party rights to assert under a statute, not whether the litigant
has a cause of action to seek particular remedies under that statute. The zone-ofinterests idea captures this principle148: one must be within the statute’s zone of
interests to have a cause of action under it, but the zone may also include people
who do not have a cause of action—who, for instance, sue under some other more
general cause of action, sue under state law, or invoke the statute as a defense.149
Other, local statutory standing doctrines are simply versions of the zone-of-interests idea that have developed in particular areas.150 Litigants outside a statute’s
zone of interests may still assert statutory rights, but only if they can fit into an
exception to the general prohibition on third-party standing.151 But in either
case, litigants should not have to establish a cause of action as a predicate to
standing.

147.

148.

149.

150.

151.
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Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 89, 89 (2009).
See Lee & Ellis, supra note 74, at 223 (“[T]he zone of interests test has greater potential utility
than merely as an adjunct to the injury, causation, and redressability requirements of Article
III. The zone of interests test connects the statute’s objective to the class of plaintiﬀs permitted
to sue.”).
“Statutory standing” strikes us as largely synonymous with “zone of interests,” but seems to
be used primarily when the question is who is entitled to pursue a particular cause of action
that a statute clearly does create. Such a statute might well circumscribe the scope of its entitlement to sue more narrowly than those who are entitled, say, to invoke the statute as a defense or pursuant to a diﬀerent, more general cause of action. See Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot.
Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 287 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that “compliance with . . . the ‘zone-of-interests’ test” is “another element of statutory standing”);
Pathak, supra note 147, at 97-98 (discussing how the zone of interests relates to statutory
standing).
See, e.g., Ass’n of Battery Recyclers v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Silberman, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hat is involved in the zone-of-interest analysis is more properly described
as ‘statutory standing.’”).
In other words, we understand the zone-of-interests inquiry as speaking to the issue of who
has first-party rights, without limiting who may raise other people’s rights. Cf. FAIC Secs.,
Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) (“We have been unable to
find any case in which the Supreme Court has relied upon the plaintiﬀ ’s failure independently
to meet the zone of interests test as the basis for its refusal to accord standing for the assertion
of third-party rights.”). But see Am. Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352,
360 (2d Cir. 2016) (interpreting Lexmark as “teach[ing] that we cannot expand the congressionally-created statutory list of those who may bring a cause of action by importing third-party
prudential considerations”).
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The zone-of-interests test appeared at the same moment that the Supreme
Court bifurcated constitutional and statutory standing.152 Data Processing replaced the relatively strict “legal interest” requirement with a factual injury requirement (as a constitutional minimum) combined with a statutory standing
rule that litigants must be “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated” by the substantive laws they invoke.153 In that case, data processing
companies sued under the APA to challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of the
Currency permitting national banks to sell data-processing services. They
claimed that the ruling would damage their businesses by subjecting them to
more competition. That injury suﬃced to allow the plaintiﬀs to invoke statutory
limits on national banks’ activities, but it did not mean that they had a valid cause
of action or were entitled to a remedy.154 Rather, the Court viewed standing “as
a preliminary issue, distinct from whether the plaintiﬀs actually have the kind of
interest that would support a claim for relief.”155
Ambiguities persist concerning the zone-of-interests test’s provenance and
its relation to doctrines of statutory standing. The Court’s general discussion in
Data Processing suggested that zone of interests was a construction of the judicial
review provisions of the APA.156 But the language of the test itself suggested a
broader application,157 it was later applied outside the APA context,158 and the
Court described it as a “requirement[] of general application.”159 Nonetheless,
the zone-of-interests test continues to exist alongside other species of statutory
standing doctrines unique to particular regulatory regimes. Antitrust plaintiﬀs,

152.

153.
154.

155.
156.

157.
158.

159.

See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEO. L.J. 317, 319 (2004).
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 153 (1970); see supra text
accompanying notes 56-60.
See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 158 (“Whether anything in the Bank Service Corporation Act
or the National Bank Act gives petitioners a ‘legal interest’ that protects them against violations of those Acts, and whether the actions of respondents did in fact violate either of those
Acts, are questions which go to the merits and remain to be decided below.”).
Nelson, supra note 45, at 738; see also Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 219 (2011) (reaﬃrming this point).
See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-54; see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (noting this origin); Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S.
388, 400 n.16 (1987) (stating that the zone-of-interests test “is not a test of universal application”).
See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153 (examining “the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question” (emphasis added)).
See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997) (applying the test to citizen-suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318,
320 n.3 (1977) (applying the test to the dormant Commerce Clause).
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163 (1997); see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 157; Siegel, supra
note 152, at 328.
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for example, “must show both constitutional standing and antitrust standing.”160
And Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plaintiﬀs must establish statutory standing by showing that they are plan “participants” or other entities entitled to sue.161
The Supreme Court directly addressed the zone-of-interest test’s relation to
other statutory standing doctrines in Lexmark.162 This may be the most important, albeit neglected, aspect of Lexmark. That case addressed whether a company alleging that it had lost customers due to false or misleading advertising by
another company fell within the zone of interests of the false advertising provision in the Lanham Act.163 Justice Scalia’s opinion for a unanimous Court said
that “[w]hether a plaintiﬀ comes within the ‘zone of interests’ is an issue that
requires us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation,
whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiﬀ ’s claim.”164 The Court had little trouble determining that the plaintiﬀ fell
within the Lanham Act’s zone of interests. And it answered the scope question
by making clear, as Professor Nelson put it, that “the zone-of-interests test operates as an implied limitation on ‘all statutorily created causes of action’ that do
not opt out of it.”165
Thus, contrary to the claim of some commentators, Lexmark neither “delivered a coup de main to the zone-of-interests test,”166 nor undermined that test’s
importance. Rather than a free-standing rule of prudential standing, zone of interests serves as a switching principle that determines which parties may assert

160.
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164.
165.
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Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 770 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983) (“Harm
to the antitrust plaintiﬀ is suﬃcient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact, but the court must make a further determination whether the plaintiﬀ is a proper
party to bring a private antitrust action.”).
See, e.g., Bridges v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 498 F.3d 442, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2007); Pathak, supra
note 147, at 110. Common-law rights likewise have their analogs to statutory standing, such
as the rules governing third-party beneficiaries in contract. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 145, at 330.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018).
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nelson, supra note 45, at 799 (quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129). Or, as Justice Scalia explained, “[i]t is ‘perhaps more accurat[e],’ though not very diﬀerent as a practical matter, to
say that the limitation always applies and is never negated, but that our analysis of certain
statutes will show that they protect a more-than-usually ‘expan[sive]’ range of interests.”
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129-30 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997)).
Brannon P. Denning & Sarah F. Bothma, Zone-of-Interests Standing in Constitutional Cases After
Lexmark, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 97, 133 (2017).
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first-party rights and which, in turn, must rely on third-party standing.167 This
does not mean that the zone-of-interests analysis will be the same for each statute. Put diﬀerently, zone of interests is not so much a test of general applicability
as a concept of universal relevance.168 “Zone of interests” describes a question
that must be asked in considering who may invoke a statute, but the doctrinal
formula for answering it will depend upon the content of the particular statute
at issue.
Lexmark’s analysis demonstrates that, although every provision of federal law
may have a zone of interests, no single test will define that zone for all such provisions. “[T]he breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the provisions
of the law at issue,” the Court explained, “so that what comes within the zone of
interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative
action under the ‘generous review provisions’ of the APA may not do so for other
purposes.”169 Hence, APA plaintiﬀs need only be “arguably” within the zone of
interests of the statute they invoke,170 but other plaintiﬀs may have a tougher
row to hoe.171 In Lexmark’s wake, it seems best to view requirements like “antitrust standing” or “ERISA standing” as simply interpretations of the zones of
interests protected by those particular statutes.172

167.

168.

169.
170.

171.
172.

See TRIBE, supra note 15, § 3-19, at 446.
We would thus qualify statements like “Congress can relax or even eliminate the zone of interests requirement.” Siegel, supra note 152, at 342. Congress can modify the scope of any given
statute’s zone of interests, and it could perhaps provide remedies even to persons who fall
outside the zone (subject to Article III’s requirement of an injury in fact). See Adam N. Steinman, Lost in Transplantation: The Supreme Court’s Post-Prudence Jurisprudence, 70 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 289, 294-95 (2017) (flagging the latter issue). But that legal provisions have zones of
interests defining the scope of rights that they confer is, in our view, simply a quality of legal
rules. Cf. supra note 165 (explaining that the zone-of-interests limitation is always implicitly
present).
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 130 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163).
See, e.g., Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209,
225 (2012)) (explaining that, in APA cases, “[t]he test forecloses suit only when a plaintiﬀ ’s
‘interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute
that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit’” (quoting
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)).
See, e.g., SAS of P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Tel. Co., 48 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing statutory
standing under the antitrust laws).
See, e.g., Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 772 (2d Cir. 2016) (asking, when evaluating whether there is antitrust standing, “[1] have appellants suﬀered antitrust injury? [2]
are appellants eﬃcient enforcers of the antitrust laws?”).
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It is crucial, however, not to misread Lexmark’s statements connecting zone
of interests with a plaintiﬀ ’s cause of action under a statute.173 The two concepts
are related, but they diﬀer in two key respects.174 First, as a preliminary screen,
Data Processing’s “arguably-within-the-zone-of-interests” test imposes a considerably more permissive standard than a plaintiﬀ would have to meet to establish
a cause of action on the merits.175 Although Lexmark holds that zone of interests
is not part of standing and (arguably) suggests that it is not jurisdictional,176 it
nonetheless remains subject to decision at the threshold. Like proximate causation, zone of interests is “an element of the cause of action under the statute” and
“must be adequately alleged at the pleading stage in order for the case to proceed.”177 Because plaintiﬀs must later prove their allegations in order to prevail,
Lexmark eﬀectively retains much of the two-tier structure of the original Data
Processing decision.
Second, the zone-of-interests analysis may apply in contexts where rights to
sue are not relevant. In Lexmark, the Court used zone-of-interests analysis to
determine whether the plaintiﬀ fit within a cause of action that Congress had
established.178 But rights are often asserted in postures that do not require a right
of action. The Court held in Bond v. United States, for example, that a criminal
defendant had prudential standing to raise a Tenth Amendment challenge to the
law under which she was prosecuted, rejecting prior authority suggesting that
she would lack such standing absent a cause of action to enforce an aﬃrmative
Tenth Amendment claim.179
Similar situations can arise in civil cases. Imagine a breach-of-contract suit
in which the defendant seeks to argue that the contract was illegal under the
173.

174.
175.

176.

177.
178.
179.
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See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 127-28; see also Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296,
1302 (2017) (stating that the zone-of-interests “question” is “whether the statute grants the
plaintiﬀ the cause of action that he asserts”).
Cf. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 219 (2011) (cautioning against conflating prudential
standing requirements with the existence of a cause of action).
See John H. Garvey, A Litigation Primer for Standing Dismissals, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 568
(1980) (“[A]rguably having a protected interest is a very diﬀerent thing from actually having
one, so winning against a standing objection is no guarantee against losing on the merits.”);
Nelson, supra note 45, at 737, 759.
See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 128 n.4) (observing that the label of “statutory standing” is “misleading, since ‘the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate
subject-matter jurisdiction’” (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635,
642-43 (2002))).
Id. at 134 n.6 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)).
See also Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1303-05 (employing zone-of-interests analysis to determine
whether plaintiﬀs fit within a statutory cause of action).
See Bond, 564 U.S. at 217-20 (disapproving contrary statements in Tennessee Electric Power Co.
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118 (1939)).
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federal antitrust laws.180 It is not obvious that only those parties upon which the
antitrust laws confer a private right of action should be allowed to invoke that
defense. Or consider a defendant sued under state tort law who defends on the
ground that the suit is preempted by federal regulatory law. No private federal
right of action exists to enforce drug-safety requirements under the federal Food,
Drug, & Cosmetics Act (FDCA), for example, and yet drug manufacturers routinely assert FDCA preemption defenses against state tort claims.181 The law
governing when that defendant might have an aﬃrmative cause of action to assert preemption is complex and turns on a variety of considerations not relevant
when preemption is asserted as a defense.182
Much the same could be said of litigants in other postures, such as plaintiﬀs
resting on some omnibus cause of action—state tort law,183 for instance, or a
general federal remedial statute like the APA or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.184 In such
cases, where the plaintiﬀ already has both an injury in fact and a right of action,
the remaining question is whether they have “statutory standing” to invoke a
particular statutory right as part of their claim.185 Our point is simply that the
right to initiate a lawsuit is not the same thing as the right to invoke a legal right
within the context of a lawsuit where the basic right to sue is not in question.
Contemporary judicial skepticism about implying rights to sue where Congress
has not explicitly created them, for example, should not color consideration of

180.

181.
182.

183.

184.
185.

Cf. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935) (involving this underlying issue, but dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574-75 (2009) (considering and rejecting the preemption argument).
See generally Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015) (acknowledging
an equitable right of action to enjoin state oﬃcers from enforcing preempted state law, but
noting that this may be unavailable when the underlying federal statute provides an administrative remedy); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108 (1989)
(discussing when a claim of preemption may be brought under § 1983).
See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (involving plaintiﬀs’
incorporation of a violation of a federal regulatory standard into their state-law tort claim).
Merrell Dow illustrates that even if the plaintiﬀ has standing to raise a federal claim, it might
not be presented in a way that will satisfy statutory requirements for federal jurisdiction. But
no one thought in that case that the lack of a federal cause of action in itself disqualified the
plaintiﬀs from having standing to sue.
See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980) (recognizing that plaintiﬀs may sue state
and local oﬃcials for violations of federal statutory rights under § 1983).
See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-84 (2002) (holding that a federal statute
creating a conditional-spending agreement between the federal government and a private university conferred no rights on individuals enforceable under § 1983); Blessing v. Freestone,
520 U.S. 329, 349-50 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that whether individuals may
enforce federal conditional-spending statutes under § 1983 is akin to determining whether a
contract confers rights on third-party beneficiaries).
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whether a litigant may invoke a statutory right as a defense.186 Critically, the
Court’s implied-right-of-action cases have explicitly distinguished the two questions.187
None of this is to deny that Lexmark speaks to cases in other postures. At
bottom, Lexmark is about the primacy of congressional intent.188 Our point is
simply that Congress’s intent may diﬀer depending on the posture of litigation.
Congress may not intend to create a private remedy to enforce a federal principle,
but it may well wish for that principle to be assertable as a defense (or at least
not intend to foreclose such a defense).189 Analysis of legislative intent must thus
be context-sensitive—that is, courts should ask whether Congress would have
wanted litigants to be able to invoke a statutory principle in the way that the
litigant actually invokes it, not simply whether Congress would have conferred
on that litigant a private right to sue. We suggest that Data Processing’s original
formulation—“whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant
is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question”190—is a good starting point for that inquiry, although particular statutes may warrant more specific analyses.

186.

187.

188.
189.

190.
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Compare Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (stating that, absent explicit textual evidence of Congress’s intent to create a private right of action, “a cause of action does not
exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter,
or how compatible with the statute”), with Ernest A. Young, In Praise of Judge Fletcher—And
of General Standing Principles, 65 ALA. L. REV. 473, 477-79 (2013) (arguing that this skepticism
should not be imported into standing doctrine).
Under Cort v. Ash, whether a statute “create[s] a federal right in favor of the plaintiﬀ ” is necessary but not suﬃcient to establish a private right of action. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The Court
has made clear that “the judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.”
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286; see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 740 (1979) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (“Asking whether a statute creates a right in favor of a private party . . . begs
the question at issue. What is involved is not the mere existence of a legal right, but a particular person’s right to invoke the power of the courts to enforce that right.”).
See Lexmark Int’l., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014).
Cf. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326-27 (noting that, “once a case
or controversy properly comes before a court, judges are bound by federal law” and that “if
an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the court may issue an
injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted,” but also observing that
“[t]he power of federal courts of equity to enjoin unlawful executive action is subject to express and implied statutory limitations”).
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). The third-party-beneficiary doctrine in contract law may oﬀer a useful analogy. See, e.g., Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism by Contract, 129 YALE L.J. 2326, 2381 (2020) (“The general rule is that the parties’ intended
beneficiaries may enforce contracts, but mere incidental beneficiaries may not.” (emphasis
added)).
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We acknowledge that “the zone-of-interests test is a doctrine of uneven application and uncertain meaning.”191 That is inevitable, given its connection to
the particular substantive law in a given case. Standing law cannot operate without some sort of switching principle identifying who can assert first-party rights
and who must rely on third-party standing. And it would be hard to imagine a
formula under which a party’s ability to assert a first-party right is not a function
of the substance of that underlying right.192 That means there cannot be any single, determinate “test” for statutory zones of interests. Rather, courts will necessarily have to do what the Court did in Lexmark—that is, develop a statute-specific measure of who falls within the zone of interests for any given statutory
right.193 Courts have and will continue to develop diﬀerent formulations for
Lanham Act cases, antitrust cases, banking cases, and so on.
Focusing on the zone-of-interests concept as our switching principle thus
makes two contributions to standing doctrine. First, it addresses the right question. Judicial decisions determining who can assert statutory rights in various
ways have asked two distinct questions that are sometimes conflated: Whom
does a statute protect or benefit? And whom does a statute empower to sue? Any
case in which a statutory right is asserted must ask the first question, but the
second arises only if the right is asserted by a plaintiﬀ, and only if that plaintiﬀ
is relying on the underlying statutory right (rather than on state law or an omnibus federal remedial statute) to furnish the cause of action. As Data Processing
said, the first question goes to the zone of interests; the second goes to the merits
of the suit. This leads to the second contribution, which is Data Processing’s insistence that the zone of interests is a preliminary screen. Even after parties establish standing to invoke a right, their rights claims remain limited by the need
to prove them on the merits and, in many cases, to fit them into a cause of action.
Courts can thus aﬀord to be generous in tracing the boundaries of the zone of
interests.
B. The Scope of Constitutional Rights
As with statutory rights, we must identify who has a first-party right to invoke constitutional claims before considering issues of third-party standing to
raise such claims. Again, the ability to assert first-party standing depends on the
underlying substantive law. As originally formulated, the zone-of-interests test

191.

TRIBE, supra note 15, § 3-19, at 446; see also Siegel, supra note 152, at 319 (describing the doctrine as “confused”).
192. See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 229.
193. See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 134-40.
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applied not only to statutes, but also to “constitutional guarantee[s].”194 Although the Court does not often use the zone-of-interests terminology in constitutional cases,195 the basic concept—that legal provisions extend their protections to classes of persons or interests that must be defined in order to determine
who may invoke those provisions—certainly still applies.196 The practical diﬃculty is that the zone can no longer be defined by Congress’s intent, and the appropriate sources for determining constitutional zones of interests are likely to
be both disputed and frequently indeterminate. Nevertheless, the substance of
the underlying law defines the limits of first-party rights in constitutional
cases—and hence the boundaries of the third-party problem—just as it does in
statutory cases.
Some constitutional principles confer enforceable rights on all persons and
some do not. Most federalism and separation-of-powers principles, for example,
have been interpreted to embody an institutional strategy of protecting individual liberty through a system of vertical and horizontal checks and balances;197
hence, any individual subject to an act of the federal government (and suﬀering
injury in fact) will generally have an enforceable interest in seeing those checks

194.

Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
But see Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977) (employing
zone-of-interest terminology in a dormant Commerce Clause case).
196. Professors Chemerinsky and Tribe have both suggested that the zone-of-interests test “is superfluous in constitutional litigation” because it will be met whenever the litigant has an injury
in fact. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.6, at 116 (8th ed. 2020) (citing
TRIBE, supra note 15, at 446). As we discuss in Part III, however, a variety of situations involve
litigants who have injuries in fact but do not fall within the zone of interests of particular
constitutional provisions, and in those cases their claims depend on invoking the rights of
others.
197. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (stating
that federalism and separation of powers provide “a double security . . . to the rights of the
people” (emphasis added)). Professor Huq denies that this is so, and this is not the place to
fully address his elaborate argument. But we think Huq is wrong to frame the question as
whether structural provisions create “individual rights” analogous to, say, rights of free
speech. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 80, at 1448-52 (addressing “Why Structural Constitutional
Rules Are Not Individual Rights”). The correct question, we have argued, is whether individuals injured by a violation of structural principles fall within the class of persons those principles are designed to protect—not whether those principles are “granular individualistic”
ones that operate in the same way as individual rights. See id. at 1450. Huq invokes the Federalists’ early skepticism about bills of rights to show that they diﬀerentiated rights from structural principles, but we read these statements—like Madison’s in Federalist 51—to show that
the structural principles upon which Federalists preferred to rely were designed to protect and
benefit individuals who might otherwise be injured by oppressive government action. That is
enough to secure our point.
195.
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and balances observed. Consider Bond v. United States,198 which held that an individual prosecuted under a federal criminal statute has standing to challenge it
on the ground that the statute exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers, notwithstanding that the limits on Congress’s powers seem primarily to protect the
rights of states. Bond invoked INS v. Chadha,199 which upheld an individual’s
right to challenge the constitutionality of a legislative veto provision on the
ground that it encroached on the power of the Executive.200 Although structural
claims most directly protect the prerogatives of institutions, courts generally
accord individuals standing to raise these claims without any talk of third-party
standing.201 Indeed, both the case law and the academic literature seem to prefer
individual suits to suits on behalf of the aﬀected institutions.202
198.

564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011).
Id. at 223 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
200. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 935-36. Professor Huq argues that cases like Bond and Chadha are
unique to the twentieth century, and that before that “there was no American judicial tradition
of enforcing structural constitutionalism.” Huq, supra note 80, at 1466. But our constitutional
canon is replete with cases in which individuals were accorded standing to invoke structural
constitutional principles in order to prevent or remedy their own particular injuries. See, e.g.,
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (the cashier of the Bank of the United
States defended against an action for debt on behalf of the State of Maryland by invoking the
supremacy of federal law and the intergovernmental immunity doctrine); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (a holder of a federal license to operate steamboats defended
against suit by competing operator to enforce exclusive state license on grounds of the
dormant Commerce Clause and federal preemption).
201. See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2196 (2020) (“Our
precedents have long permitted private parties aggrieved by an oﬃcial’s exercise of executive
power to challenge the oﬃcial’s authority to wield that power while insulated from removal
by the President.”). In criticizing individual standing to raise structural constitutional claims,
Professor Huq suggests that these claims involve mere “generalized grievances” about compliance with the law. See Huq, supra note 80, at 1437. A crucial diﬀerence, however, is that in
these cases the litigant is subject to government action and has a concrete, individualized injury stemming from the constitutional violation (being criminally prosecuted in Bond or deported in Chadha), which is not true when litigants assert a general interest in government
law compliance. Cf. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (describing a generalized grievance as one “seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits [the claimant] than it does the public at large”). More fundamentally, the basic “template” that Huq sees
as organizing all standing doctrine—that “Article III aims to . . . exclude from justiciability
[those] disputes with non-trivial spillover eﬀects onto unrepresented parties,” Huq, supra
note 80, at 1466—appears in neither Article III itself nor the caselaw interpreting it. And such
a template would seem to us to exclude not only structural cases but most rights cases, as well.
Does anyone doubt that the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), had spillover eﬀects
far beyond the actual parties to the lawsuit—or that a decision overruling Roe would have farreaching eﬀects as well?
202. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833-34 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Grove, supra note
80, at 612. We do not argue that institutional suits should be disfavored. See, e.g., Ernest A.
199.
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Other constitutional rights are personal to someone experiencing a particular
type of harm from the constitutional violation. For example, the Court has construed the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches as a
“personal right”; hence, “only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated [can] benefit from the [exclusionary] rule’s protections.”203 “A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or
property,” the Court explained, “has not had any of his Fourth Amendment
rights infringed.”204
Still other constitutional principles may have both general and personal aspects; some aspects protect everyone, while others protect only members of a
particular class. Under the Eighth Amendment, for example, all criminal defendants seem to have an interest in a procedural system that reserves the death penalty for only the worst oﬀenders and evaluates factors of aggravation and mitigation in a fair way, and even someone who clearly falls into the death-eligible
category may enforce those requirements.205 But we expect that the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on capital punishment for juvenile oﬀenders206 is limited to
such oﬀenders and that others cannot enforce it even when subjected to a law
that allows for such punishment. One could, perhaps, quibble with our assertions about the substantive constitutional law on particular points. But it is hard
to deny that constitutional principles vary in the extent to which they convey
personal interests.
Carefully interpreting the scope of first-party rights in constitutional cases
can, as in statutory cases, narrow the set of cases raising third-party problems.
Powers v. Ohio,207 for example, held that a white criminal defendant had thirdparty standing to challenge the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to
exclude potential African American jurors. Although the prosecution’s action violated no equal-protection right of the defendant, the Court reasoned, “[t]he
jury acts as a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the State and
Young, State Standing and Cooperative Federalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893, 1916-21
(2019) (arguing in favor of institutional litigation by state governments).
203. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978).
204. Id. at 134; see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (“[T]he defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party.”). For a dispute among the Justices over
whether an equal-protection challenge should have been viewed in first-party or third-party
terms, see Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). See also TRIBE, supra note 15, at 436 (discussing Miller).
205. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US. 586, 605 (1978).
206. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
207. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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its prosecutors” and “[t]he intrusion of racial discrimination into the jury selection process damages both the fact and the perception of this guarantee.”208
Hence “the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution
causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury, and the defendant has a concrete
interest in challenging the practice.”209 While the Court framed its account as
one involving the application of third-party standing doctrine, the Court’s reasoning could be read to suggest that the constitutional rule against race-based
juror challenges is a structural protection, akin to that in Bond. If so, Powers
might have had a first-party claim and no need to invoke third-party standing.210
To be sure, determining the scope of a constitutional provision’s zone of interests will not always be easy. The exercise involves all the diﬃculties that make
constitutional interpretation, in general, more controversial than statutory interpretation, including the usual debates about whether and to what extent it is
proper to consider materials other than the constitutional text. Diﬃcult or not,
however, there is no getting around the need to determine who is covered by a
constitutional right and who is not. The Court has had to consider it, for example, in determining whether a given constitutional principle creates personal
rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.211 And a long line of Fourth Amendment cases shows that courts have to face diﬃcult questions about who may assert rights against unreasonable searches—whether or not they label that inquiry
one of “standing.”212
As with statutes, it would be a mistake to equate the zone of interests of constitutional provisions with the extent to which those provisions confer rights of
action on litigants. The Supreme Court has used the zone-of-interests concept,
for example, to describe who may assert rights under the dormant Commerce

208.

Id. at 411-12.
Id. at 411.
210. Cf. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) (reasoning that the state “suﬀers [an] injury
when the fairness and integrity of its own judicial process is undermined”). Professor Fallon
doubts there is any constitutional right to be tried by a jury untainted by racial discrimination
and thus views Powers as necessarily involving third-party standing. See Fallon, supra note 17,
at 1363. As he notes, the Supreme Court had held a year before Powers that a prosecutor’s use
of peremptory challenges to strike African American jurors did not violate the Sixth Amendment rights of a white defendant. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). Our point is
simply that first-party standing was plausible in Powers, which thus illustrates the importance
of unpacking first-party and third-party claims.
211. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447-50 (1991) (considering whether § 1983 confers
a right of action for dormant Commerce Clause violations).
212. See cases cited supra notes 203-204.
209.
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Clause.213 But dormant Commerce Clause claims are generally asserted as defenses to the enforcement of a state law,214 as part of either a state declaratory
judgment action or a federal equitable action to enjoin enforcement of such a
law,215 or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.216 To our knowledge, the Court has never had
occasion to consider whether the Commerce Clause itself confers a private right
of action—and given the settled availability of the other remedial vehicles, it
probably never will.
One reason to decouple the protective scope of constitutional principles from
private rights of action in order to enforce them is that the enforcement of constitutional rights through private lawsuits based on those rights is a comparatively new phenomenon. For much of our history, constitutional rights have
been enforced in court in one of two ways. If the government initiates an action
against a private actor, then that actor might raise a constitutional defense to the
government’s action.217 Or, a private party might bring suit against a government oﬃcial under the common law—typically in an action for trespass—and
the oﬃcial might raise their governmental authority as a defense to the action.
The unconstitutionality of the oﬃcial’s action would then come in as an answer
to this defense of authority.218 Either way, the invocation of constitutional rights
would not depend upon the existence of a private “right of action” to enforce
those rights. Certainly, the ability of contemporary litigants to invoke constitutional principles as defenses or in other contexts wherein they need not rely on
those principles as the basis of a lawsuit should not depend on their entitlement
to a private right of action.

213.

214.
215.

216.
217.
218.

40

See Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977); see also Denning &
Bothma, supra note 166, at 125 (noting that “the lower courts have applied zone-of-interests
standing in [dormant Commerce Clause] cases with some frequency”).
See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 324 (1979).
See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1990)
(state-law suit for a refund of taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute); S. Cent. Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 86 (1984) (federal equitable action). The latter action
would rest on the federal courts’ traditional equitable powers to enjoin state enforcement of
an unconstitutional law, not an implied right of action under the Constitution itself. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324-26 (2015).
See Dennis, 498 U.S. at 451.
See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 45, at 712.
See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 881.
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The history of constitutional enforcement has several further implications.
Most constitutional provisions became part of the document prior to the conceptual development of “causes of action” in American law.219 Rights to sue in
the early Republic were provided by the common-law forms of actions, not legislatively created causes of action tailored to particular positive legal rights and
obligations.220 The Framers of these provisions thus had no occasion to consider,
in the way that modern Congresses must consider, whether to provide new rights
of action to enforce the rights they created. Courts tasked with seeking the original understanding of a plaintiﬀ ’s “right of action” to enforce the First Amendment, à la Lexmark, would be searching for something that does not exist.
For related reasons, the development of private rights to enforce constitutional principles has been complex and variable depending on the remedy being
sought.221 Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, someone subject to an allegedly
unlawful regulation may sue to enjoin its enforcement.222 Drawing on “a long
history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England,” the
Court has generally held that “federal courts may in some circumstances grant
injunctive relief against state oﬃcers who are violating, or planning to violate,
federal law.”223 The Court recognized an implied right of action for damages
against federal oﬃcials for constitutional violations much later,224 perhaps because the more urgent need for a comparable right against state oﬃcials had been
answered during Reconstruction.225 More recently, the Court’s Bivens line of

219.

220.
221.
222.

223.
224.
225.

With some justice, Professor Monaghan has observed that “‘cause of action’ is a term thought
to possess such intractable diﬃculties that it was banished from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,” although “the term persists in the working vocabulary of lawyers and judges with
the tenacity of original sin.” Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983
and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 249 (1991).
See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 780 (2004).
See generally Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Oﬃcial Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 396, 414-77 (1987) (describing this history).
See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326 (2015) (“As we have long recognized, if an individual claims federal law immunizes him from state regulation, the court
may issue an injunction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted.”); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 326-27.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971).
See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at § 1983); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 986.
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cases has become very restrictive,226 but these cases rest on skepticism about judicial creation of rights to sue for damages and should have little bearing on assertion of rights in other contexts.
The zone-of-interests inquiry on the statutory side has generally been concerned with the interests Congress sought to protect, not with distinguishing
among particular remedies. For constitutional issues, we contend that courts
should similarly focus on whether a litigant’s claim falls within the general set of
interests protected by a particular constitutional principle—interests that are to
be ascertained by reference to whatever materials the courts consider appropriate
for constitutional interpretation (such as text, structure, and history).227 As we
have demonstrated, some constitutional provisions protect general interests and
some do not. Faithful application of the zone-of-interests test will yield a variety
of diﬀerent outcomes across the range of diverse constitutional provisions and
principles.228 Where no first-party right is available, some constitutional arguments will have to be asserted as third-party claims.
C. A Critique of the “Valid Rule” Idea
Some commentators would analyze constitutional cases quite diﬀerently.
They might say that, in a case like June Medical Services, the doctors have a firstparty right to be regulated by a valid law in this and in all situations, and that a
law is invalid if it violates the abortion rights of their patients. Formulations of
this “valid rule” idea diﬀer, but the basic contention is that, as Professor Monaghan has stated, “a litigant has always had the right to be judged in accordance
with a constitutionally valid rule of law.”229 Professor Fallon has similarly argued

226.

See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020) (“[F]or almost 40 years, we have consistently rebuﬀed requests to add to the claims allowed under Bivens.”).
227. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) (listing “modalities”
of constitutional argument). Courts, lawyers, and scholars will of course disagree about the
right approach for deriving constitutional zones of interest. Our framework neither presupposes a particular approach to these interpretive debates nor purports to resolve them. The
point is simply that, as with any view of standing in which the substance of the underlying
right plays a key role, see sources cited supra note 142, the class of persons holding first-party
rights to invoke a particular constitutional principle will depend on the substantive meaning
of that principle, however derived.
228. See, e.g., Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131, 154 (2d Cir. 2019) (discussing standing in the Emoluments Clause suit against President Trump), vacated as moot,
141 S. Ct. 1262 (2021).
229. Monaghan, supra note 79, at 3; see also Monaghan, supra note 17, at 285 (referring to the “conventional principle that a litigant’s conduct may be regulated only in accordance with a valid
rule”).
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that “everyone has a personal right, independent of third-party standing, to challenge the enforcement of a constitutionally invalid statute against her.”230 Under
the valid rule hypothesis, however formulated, many of the cases recognizing
third-party standing could be understood not as third-party standing cases at
all, but rather as first-party standing cases involving a constitutional right of the
claimant not to be subject to the rule. Professors Litman and Vladeck, for example, argue that June Medical Services should be understood as involving first-party
standing, not third-party standing, because the doctors had a “right to be free
from an unlawful statute.”231
To the extent that this valid rule hypothesis would expand the class of litigants who may challenge invalid government action, it reflects early enthusiasm
for a public-rights model of adjudication never fully embraced by the Supreme
Court.232 In any event, as we discuss below, the hypothesis is diﬃcult to reconcile
with the Court’s more variegated approach to constitutional rights, and it is both
too narrow and too broad to explain the third-party standing doctrine. It is too
narrow in the sense that it only applies to situations where the litigant is subject
to or regulated by the allegedly invalid rule.233 As we explain in Part III, however,
third-party standing is sometimes proper even when this is not the case. The
valid rule hypothesis is also too narrow because it seems to apply only to constitutional claims; it oﬀers no explanation for the operation of the third-party
standing doctrine in statutory cases. On the other hand, the hypothesis is too
broad in the sense that it ascribes to all constitutional claims a quality that is true
only of a subset of them. To proceed, the valid rule argument, too, needs to be
unpacked.
To begin, it is not true as a general doctrinal matter that a law that is invalid
as applied to some persons can necessarily be challenged by all persons that it
governs. Consider a murder statute providing that anyone committing first-degree murder is subject to the death penalty (if suﬃcient aggravating factors are
found) without regard to age. That statute is plainly unconstitutional as applied
230.

Fallon, supra note 17, at 1327.
231. Leah Litman & Steve Vladeck, June Medical Services and the Future of Article III Standing in
Abortion Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 3, 2020, 2:56 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/
02/symposium-june-medical-services-and-the-future-of-article-iii-standing-in-abortion
-cases [https://perma.cc/E6J7-9E7W]; see also Brief of Federal Courts Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 17, June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020)
(Nos. 18-1323, 18-1460) (citing to the “valid-rule principle”).
232. See supra Section I.A; see also, e.g., Dorf, supra note 17, at 244-46 (identifying opposition to the
valid rule hypothesis with traditional private-law values of separation of powers and concrete
judicial decisionmaking).
233. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Valid Rule Due Process Challenges: Bond v. United States and Erie’s
Constitutional Source, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987, 1020 (2013) (“[A] regulated individual can
mount a valid rule due process challenge, while an unregulated individual cannot.”).
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to minors.234 But does anyone think that someone who committed their murder
at the age of thirty-five can challenge the statute on that ground of invalidity?
The personal scope of Fourth Amendment rights presents a similar diﬃculty: a
criminal defendant may not block the introduction of evidence obtained through
a violation of some other person’s Fourth Amendment rights merely by claiming
a right to be tried based on validly obtained evidence.235
To be sure, there are situations in which a rule (or action) is invalid as applied
to everyone. For example, if Congress fails to follow the Article I process when
enacting a federal criminal statute, the statute could not be validly applied to
anyone.236 But this would be because Article I is viewed as conferring first-party
rights, as discussed above in Section II.B. The same can be said for statutes invalidated under the void-for-vagueness doctrine: a statute cannot be applied
even to constitutionally regulable conduct if it is unduly vague, but this is because the statute gives insuﬃcient notice to guide law enforcement, even with
respect to persons engaged in constitutionally unprotected conduct.237 Moreover, some constitutional tests—for example, tests that focus on the motive behind the enactment of a statute—may themselves require invalidation of a statute

234.

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
235. See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text. The Fourth Amendment example brings two
additional diﬃculties to mind. That Amendment tends to be violated not by statutes or legislative rules but by executive acts amounting to an illegal search. Such acts are not obviously
“rules” at all, and, in any event, it is not obvious that an illegal search of person A’s property
that yields evidence against person B has subjected person B to any invalid action at all. It is
not clear the valid rule hypothesis can explain the operation of standing doctrine in such cases.
Right holders may waive their Fourth Amendment rights, and so a second diﬃculty concerns
how to think about such waivers in relation to the valid rule hypothesis. Professor Roosevelt,
for example, says that a waiver by the right holder can transform an invalid rule into a valid
one. See Roosevelt, supra note 233, at 1016. But if the right holder can obviate any valid rule
claim for other aﬀected parties, in what sense do those parties have a personal, first-party right
to be judged by a valid rule? To be sure, some important and general rights—like the right to
be free of national actions falling outside of Congress’s constitutional authority—are not subject to waiver. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992). We do not understand
valid rule proponents to say that all constitutional rights have that quality, however. Yet the
waivability of most constitutional rights suggests serious limitations on the valid rule hypothesis. Professor Dorf, for example, contends that “[t]he Constitution does not create, in so
many words, an individual right to be judged only by a constitutional law. But the Constitution certainly forbids a court from enforcing an unconstitutional law.” Dorf, supra note 17, at
248. In reality, though, courts may enforce unconstitutional rules in any case in which the
person subject to the rule fails to challenge the rule or otherwise waives their rights.
236. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (allowing an individual to contest the operation of a
legislative veto that was alleged to violate the process set forth in Article I, Section 7).
237. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 71-72 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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as applied to everyone.238 We have already suggested that these situations can be
explained by reference to specific first-party rights without the need to hypothesize a general constitutional right not to be subjected to an invalid rule.239 But
in any event the law recognizes no general principle that every constitutional provision operates in conformity with the valid rule hypothesis. As Professor Fallon
observes, “[c]onstitutional rights are diverse.”240
Rather than insisting that every constitutional principle creates a right to be
free from an invalid rule, proponents of the hypothesis tend to describe this requirement as an independent, freestanding right. But the constitutional source
of the purported right to be subject to a valid rule is unclear. Professor Fallon has
suggested, variously, that the valid rule idea stems from “the history and structure of the Constitution” and its “deeper values”;241 that it arises from Marbury
v. Madison and the rule of law;242 and that it could “easily” be grounded in the
Due Process Clause.243 Professor Monaghan has invoked a right of “interactive
liberty”—a “freedom to interact with a third person who himself could not be
legally prevented from engaging in the interaction”—as a basis for at least some
applications of the valid rule idea.244 While describing Fallon’s and Monaghan’s
arguments as “conclusory,” Professor Dorf concludes that the valid rule idea can
be grounded in Marbury.245
238.

See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1338.
239. See supra Section II.B. In a sweeping account of the structure of American constitutional law,
Professor Adler has argued that constitutional rights are “rights against rules”—that is, “[a]
constitutional right protects the rights-holder from a particular rule (a rule with the wrong
predicate or history); it does not protect a particular action of hers from all the rules under
which the action falls.” Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998). On Adler’s account, courts should invalidate
even proper applications of a rule if some applications of the rule would be unconstitutional,
although courts have some remedial authority to revise rules so that they do not have such
improper applications. See id. at 6. If accepted, his account would substantially change the law
of standing—for example, eliminating the idea of as-applied challenges and substantially relaxing the injury requirement for Article III standing. See id. at 166-68. Although there is
much that we admire in Adler’s analysis, we agree with Professor Fallon that “there is no reason to adopt a position so discordant with settled ideals and understandings.” Fallon, supra
note 17, at 1335.
240. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Facial Challenges, Saving Constructions, and Statutory Severability, 99
TEX. L. REV. 215, 241 (2020).
241. Fallon, supra note 17, at 1331.
242. Id. at 1332 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
243. Id. at 1333; see also Roosevelt, supra note 233, at 989 (relying likewise on substantive due process).
244. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 299, 304. We think these cases are better explained as protecting
the third-party right holders’ rights. See infra Section III.A.
245. See Dorf, supra note 17, at 243, 246-48 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137).
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We doubt that the Supreme Court is eager to recognize a new constitutional
right to justify its approach to third-party standing, whether derived from constitutional structure, the rule of law, due process, or the freedom of association.246 Nor, contrary to Dorf’s argument, does the valid rule idea follow from
Marbury. While Marbury did state that “a law repugnant to the [C]onstitution is
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument,”247 the question implicated by the valid rule idea is whether a law that is
validly applied to a litigant is in fact “repugnant to the Constitution” merely because it may violate the rights of third parties not before the court. That issue
was not presented in Marbury. And, in fact, Marbury emphasized that, in providing remedies “for the violation of a vested legal right,” “[t]he province of the
court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.”248 The Hart and Wechsler
casebook thus reads Marbury as an exemplar of the private-law model of adjudication, observing that “Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion . . . treats the law declaration power as incidental to the resolution of a concrete dispute occasioned by
Marbury’s claim to a ‘private right’ to take possession of the oﬃce.”249 That decision did not establish a general judicial obligation to strike down unconstitutional laws, and we are unaware of any Supreme Court decisions recognizing any
such power.250
Supporters of the valid rule idea typically qualify it by reference to the doctrine of severability.251 Although no one can be sanctioned based on an invalid
rule, they contend, a rule that appears to sanction both constitutionally protected
and unprotected conduct can sometimes be subjected to a narrowing construction and therefore lawfully applied to the unprotected conduct. The “narrowed”
246.

247.
248.
249.

250.

251.
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See Lea, supra note 6, at 316 (“The problem with the valid-rule approach is that no provision
of the Constitution creates the requisite right to a valid rule . . . .”); Dorf, supra note 17, at 243
(criticizing Monaghan’s and Fallon’s accounts of the source of the rule).
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 163, 170.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 73; see also Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965) (“Federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
do not pass on constitutional questions because there is a special function vested in them to
enforce the Constitution or police the other agencies of government. They do so rather for the
reason that they must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and in
doing so must give eﬀect to the supreme law of the land. That is, at least, what Marbury v.
Madison was all about.” (footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (“We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question
may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suﬀered or threatened,
presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act.”).
See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 17, at 249-51; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial
Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 953-59 (2011); Fallon, supra note 17, at 1331-35; Monaghan,
supra note 79, at 5.
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rule, in other words, would now be valid. Whether such a narrowing construction is available, it is said, turns on principles of severability. Adding severability
doctrine into the analysis reduces the gap between the valid rule idea and modern
judicial practice. But this qualification, at bottom, illustrates why third-party
standing can be understood without recourse to a free-standing valid rule principle.
The most familiar form of severability analysis asks whether an unconstitutional provision within a statute may be severed from those other provisions raising no constitutional diﬃculty.252 In terms of our discussion, such cases ask
when valid rules may be severed from invalid ones when valid and invalid rules
are packaged within a common enactment. Proponents of the valid rule idea have
instead focused on a diﬀerent form of severability analysis involving the applications of a statute. If a single statutory provision has both valid and invalid applications, can the statute be treated as “valid” with respect to the constitutional
applications by severing the unconstitutional ones? Existing law treats this as a
question of statutory interpretation, and the Court has said that there is “a strong
presumption of severability” for a statute’s constitutionally valid applications.253
But the law regarding these sorts of situations, which involve claims of “facial”
invalidity and “overbreadth,”254 is littered with inconsistencies. The Court has
said that facial challenges are disfavored,255 but it often seems to allow them.256

252.

253.
254.

255.

256.

See, e.g., California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2115 (2021) (considering whether, if the individual-mandate portion of the Aﬀordable Care Act is unconstitutional, the rest of the Act’s provisions must be struck down as well); cf. Fallon, supra note 240, at 233 (“The concept of statutory severability . . . can apply to denominated provisions of a statute, to linguistic subunits
within a provision, or to a single provision’s various applications.”). See generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 170-74 (discussing the severability and “separability” of statutes).
Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2350 (2020).
For discussion of potential distinctions between overbreadth challenges and other facial challenges, see Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 375-85 (1998). See also Fallon, supra note 251, at 965 (“[N]ot
all facial challenges depend on determinations of overbreadth.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (“The delicate power of pronouncing
an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases
thus imagined.”); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219
(1912) (“[T]his Court must deal with the case in hand and not with imaginary ones.”).
See generally Dorf, supra note 17, at 251-64 (canvassing the doctrine); Fallon, supra note 251, at
935-42 (same).
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Moreover, it has said that overbreadth challenges are limited to claims under the
First Amendment,257 but it appears to allow them in other contexts as well.258
We will not try to clean up these confusions here. Our point is simply that
they do not oﬀer a useful lens for considering third-party standing. We thus oﬀer
two observations. The first is that the Court’s allowance or disallowance of such
challenges appears to turn on a variety of factors—including the relevant constitutional standards, principles of statutory interpretation, the way that particular
cases are litigated, the remedial authority of the courts, and the level of generality
of the Court’s constitutional reasoning—rather than on any general valid rule
concept.259 Positing such a general right, derived from the Constitution and inhering in individuals, would both depart from and presumably change the nature of current practice significantly.
The second point is that allowing for severability may give away the valid
rule store, at least insofar as it relates to third-party standing. As we understand
it, the essential point of the valid rule argument is that each individual has a right
to be judged or regulated only according to a valid rule of law, and that rules are
not valid if they violate any of the constitutional constraints on the government’s
exercise of its powers, with respect to any individual. Much turns, however, on
what it means for a rule to be “valid” or “invalid.” Professor Roosevelt, for example, rejects the notion that “any invalid application dooms a statute”; he thus
recognizes a “severability bar” under which “the fact that a law might be unconstitutional as applied to individual A, whose conduct is protected, will not prevent it from being applied to individual B, whose conduct is not.”260 A rule is
valid, in other words, in situations where no one’s rights are violated.261
If this is right, then the only situations in which a litigant whose first-party
rights are not violated by a rule could nonetheless successfully challenge that rule
257.

See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 268 n.18 (1984) (“[W]e have not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment.”); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100
YALE L.J. 853, 859 (1991) (“Outside the First Amendment context, the problem of when someone should be able to argue that a statute is ‘facially invalid,’ because it reaches constitutionally
protected conduct that might be engaged in by parties not before the court, typically is treated
as one of ‘third-party standing’ or ‘jus tertii.’”).
258. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 251, at 944-45 (giving examples of structural constitutional decisions that in eﬀect invalidated laws on overbreadth grounds).
259. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 17, at 238 (“The proper disposition of a facial challenge is intimately
bound up in questions of substantive constitutional law, institutional competence, and statutory interpretation.”); Fallon, supra note 17, at 1324 (“[T]he availability of facial challenges
varies on a doctrine-by-doctrine basis and is a function of the applicable substantive tests of
constitutional validity.”).
260. Roosevelt, supra note 233, at 1006-08.
261. See id. at 1008.
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as invalid would be situations in which application of the rule to the litigant violates the rights of a third party. Other applications, in which the litigant is regulated by the rule but that regulation implicates no one else’s constitutional
rights, would be severable and valid. We would agree, as we explain in the next
Part, that a litigant should be allowed to assert third-party standing in cases
where enforcement of the challenged rule against the litigant would violate the
third party’s rights. But we think such standing can be justified simply by the
need to enforce those rights, without recourse to any general valid rule principle.
Even its supporters acknowledge that “it is hard to identify direct judicial
aﬃrmations of the valid rule requirement.”262 Notably, not a single Justice suggested the valid rule idea in June Medical Services. Rather, all assumed that the
case presented an issue of third-party standing, not first-party standing. We
think their assumption was correct. There is simply no need to hypothesize a
previously unrecognized constitutional right to explain the decisions in which
the Court has allowed third-party standing by directly regulated parties. Conversely, a right to be regulated only by a valid rule does nothing to explain cases
where nonregulated parties are allowed to invoke third-party rights. We try to
develop a more helpful set of principles in the next Part.263
iii.

three types of third-party problems

This Part lays out three categories of parties who assert third-party standing:
directly regulated parties, collaterally injured parties, and representative parties.
The Court’s third-party standing doctrine does not overtly distinguish between
these categories. Nevertheless, the categories tend to track not only the results in
actual cases, but also the specific reasons given to support those results. These
categorical diﬀerences are more important, we contend, than the basic relationship-plus-obstacle test that the doctrine emphasizes. However, as we will explain, that test does continue to be relevant in many third-party standing cases.

262.

Fallon, supra note 17, at 1333. However, two Justices seemed to endorse the idea in Bond v.
United States. See 564 U.S. 211, 226 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Fallon and Monaghan for the proposition that “Bond, like any other defendant, has a
personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law”).
263. For additional criticism of the valid rule argument, see Adler, supra note 239, at 160; Matthew
D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Professor
Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1396-1402 (2000); and Huq, supra note 80, at 1453-57.
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A. Directly Regulated Parties
The case law has mostly been kind to regulatory subjects asserting thirdparty claims like the ones in June Medical Services.264 It is hard to explain this
pattern in terms of the traditional requirement that parties show a close relationship to the right holders and identify an obstacle preventing the right holders
from litigating their own rights. For example, abortion doctors may or may not
have much of a relationship with their patients (especially not their prospective
patients), and the impediments to patients asserting their own claims are not
always clear. Some scholars have argued that a regulatory subject always has
standing to challenge a law restricting their actions.265 These arguments are often simply explicit or implicit restatements of the valid rule idea discussed
above.266 But as the general ban on overbreadth challenges outside the First
Amendment context illustrates, criminal defendants are typically not allowed to
argue that, although a law is constitutional as applied to them, it should be disregarded on the ground that it is unconstitutional as applied to others.267
When litigants are directly regulated, they can generally show a concrete injury suﬃcient to satisfy Article III; the only question is what rights they can invoke.268 Our thesis is that the key consideration in deciding whether those subject to regulation can assert third-party standing is whether enforcement of the
challenged rule or policy against the litigant would itself plausibly violate the third
party’s rights. As we have already discussed, the bar to invoking third-party rights
should be understood as prudential in such a case, and it can be relaxed in the

264.

We use the label “directly regulated party” for convenience, as it describes the majority of the
cases. But some parties are subject to a challenged action in a way that “regulated” does not
capture well. Examples include a person placed in a chokehold by police, see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97-99 (1983), and a criminal defendant denied counsel, see Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 127-29 (2004). Because these persons are on the receiving end of
the action they challenge, we use “regulated parties” to describe all of them in speaking of this
category.
265. See, e.g., Litman & Vladeck, supra note 231.
266. See, e.g., id. (drawing on Monaghan and Fallon); Roosevelt, supra note 233, at 1015 (“The
Court has frequently entertained challenges from regulated individuals that the statute governing their conduct is void, even if the reason for voidness is not a right personal to them.
This argument is a standard valid rule due process claim.” (footnote omitted)).
267. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (“[O]ne to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it
might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional.”).
268. As we have noted, they will nearly always be able to allege the violation of some first-party
right, but they may have a better chance to prevail if they can invoke the particular rights held
by others. See supra text accompanying notes 140-142.
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service of other important values. Preventing a violation of the third party’s
rights should generally be suﬃcient reason to relax that bar.
This rationale helps explain why third-party standing is tolerated in some
settings but not others. The Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,269 for
example, allowed the NAACP to resist a state subpoena for its membership lists
by invoking its members’ right to freedom of association; production of the lists,
under the circumstances, would have vitiated those members’ rights. Similarly,
some legal restrictions on the ability of doctors to perform abortions may well
amount to an undue burden on a woman’s right to obtain one, which helps explain why doctors are often allowed to raise their patients’ abortion rights.270 It
seems likely that some, but not all, restrictions on the manufacture of firearms
would impose an unconstitutional burden on the individual right to keep and
bear arms.271 Executing an adult murderer for crimes committed as an adult, on
the other hand, has no bearing on the right of another murderer not to be executed for a crime committed as a minor. There will be any number of intermediate cases. Thus, contrary to the contention of some scholars, the “direct regulation” cases should not be understood as reflecting any general right not to be
subject to an invalid rule.
Our position on this point is similar to one advocated in a 1974 student note
attributed to the late Professor Meltzer.272 That note argued that third-party
standing was appropriate whenever compliance with a challenged regulation
presents a “risk of dilution” of third-party rights. “In order to avoid the possibility of dilution,” it said, a litigant “should always be granted standing to claim
that the imposition of a duty on him aﬀects his behavior in such a way that the
constitutional rights of third parties are impaired.”273

269.

357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
See, e.g., June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2118-20 (2020) (plurality opinion).
271. See, e.g., Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 678 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Teixeira, as the
would-be operator of a gun store, thus has derivative standing to assert the subsidiary right
to acquire arms on behalf of his potential customers.”). The retail market for firearms may
well be more robust than that for abortion services, although conditions will no doubt vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. And we can certainly imagine sales restrictions suﬃciently
draconian as to meaningfully burden the right to possess a gun.
272. Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 425, 431-36 (1974). For
attribution of this note to Meltzer, see Vickie C. Jackson, Honoring Dan Meltzer—Congressional
Standing and the Institutional Framework of Article III: A Comparative Perspective, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1783, 1783 n.1 (2016). Professor Tribe agrees that “the target of a criminal prosecution should always have standing to argue that his compliance with the law would have
deprived others of their constitutional rights.” TRIBE, supra note 15, § 3-19, at 439.
273. Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, supra note 272, at 432 (footnote omitted); see also
TRIBE, supra note 15, § 3-19, at 437 (endorsing Meltzer’s reasoning).
270.
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While we agree with the thrust of this argument, we oﬀer three friendly
amendments. First, “dilution” is unduly vague; the focus should instead be on
whether the challenged regulation plausibly violates the third party’s rights (for
example, by imposing a potentially undue burden on women seeking to have an
abortion). Second, although Professor Meltzer’s note spoke only of constitutional rights, we would make clear that the same analysis applies to statutory
rights as well. Finally, we think it is an overstatement to say that third-party
standing is “always” appropriate in this setting, although we agree that the presumption should be in its favor.
Consistent with our argument, the Supreme Court has sometimes suggested
the centrality of the eﬀect of the challenged regulation or conduct on the third
party’s rights.274 But the implications and limits of this approach have remained
largely unexplored. It oﬀers, for example, a more parsimonious explanation of
the third-party standing cases that Professor Monaghan ascribed to “interactive
liberty.”275 Barrows v. Jackson,276 for example, was a suit for breach of a racially
restrictive covenant against homeowners who had sold their home to an African
American family. The Court held that the white defendants could assert the
equal-protection rights of the African American buyers, notwithstanding the
general rule against third-party standing.277 Monaghan would recast Barrows as
a case in which both the seller and the buyer have a right “to interact . . . free
from unjustified governmental discrimination.”278 But we think it more straightforward to view Barrows as the Court in fact viewed it—as a case in which enforcing the discriminatory covenant against the litigant would violate the rights
of the African American right holders.279

274.

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
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See, e.g., June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2118-19; Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130 (2004)
(noting that “this Court has allowed standing to litigate the rights of third parties when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510 (1975)) (emphasis in
Kowalski)); cf. U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990) (“When . . . enforcement of a restriction against the litigant prevents a third party from entering into a relationship with the litigant (typically a contractual relationship), to which relationship the third
party has a legal entitlement (typically a constitutional entitlement), third-party standing has
been held to exist.”). In other instances, the Court has referred to the eﬀect of the litigation
on third-party interests as simply another factor in the third-party standing analysis. See, e.g.,
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989).
See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 297-301.
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
See id. at 257-58.
Monaghan, supra note 17, at 300.
The Court stated, for example:
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One trouble with our approach is that analyzing whether enforcement of the
challenged law against the litigant violates a third party’s rights tends to collapse
standing into the merits of the underlying claim.280 In June Medical Services, for
instance, the likelihood that Louisiana’s restrictions on which doctors may perform abortions would so restrict access to the procedure as to unduly burden the
rights of women seeking abortions simply was the question on the merits. Such
overlap between standing and the merits is quite common, although it is not
often forthrightly addressed.281 That the defendant caused the plaintiﬀ ’s injury,
for example, is both an element of most causes of action and a requirement of
Article III standing.282 In theory, a toxic-tort plaintiﬀ who cannot prove that a
polluter’s discharge of a chemical into the groundwater caused the plaintiﬀ ’s
cancer283 should lose on standing grounds as well as on the merits. In practice,
this sort of overlap is most often ignored.284 Collapsing the standing question
entirely into the merits would be inconsistent with that question’s role as a
screening mechanism, and it would sacrifice the practical benefits of resolving

If a state court awards damages for breach of a restrictive covenant, a prospective
seller of restricted land will either refuse to sell to non-Caucasians or else will require non-Caucasians to pay a higher price to meet the damages which the seller
may incur. Solely because of their race, non-Caucasians will be unable to purchase,
own, and enjoy property on the same terms as Caucasians. Denial of this right by
state action deprives such non-Caucasians, unidentified but identifiable, of equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
346 U.S. at 254.
280. See, e.g., Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, supra note 272, at 427-28 (noting the extent
to which the Court’s rulings granting or denying third-party standing dovetail with the success—or likely success—of the claims on the merits).
281. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-86
(2000) (dancing around the overlap between causation on the merits and causation for traceability and redressability purposes).
282. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132 (2014)
(“[W]e generally presume that a statutory cause of action is limited to plaintiﬀs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute.”).
283. Cf. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (illustrating the causation diﬃculties associated
with adjudicating mass tort claims).
284. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 347 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting the
overlap but concluding simply that a diﬃcult causation issue was “best left to the rigors of
evidentiary proof at a future stage of the proceedings, rather than dispensed with as a threshold question of constitutional standing”), rev’d on other grounds, 564 U.S. 410 (2011); Martin
H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing: A Proposed Solution to the Serious (but
Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1415-17 (2014) (discussing
the potential overlap between causation problems at the standing and merits phases of litigation).
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standing problems early in litigation.285 To avoid this problem, we suggest that
the violation of the third party’s rights need only be plausible.286 In June Medical
Services, for example, the abortion providers should not have had to prove that
the Louisiana law constituted an undue burden on the right of women to obtain
an abortion in order to have standing to raise that argument.287
Standing doctrine has never come up with a wholly satisfactory way to reconcile the need to resolve jurisdictional questions at the threshold with the reality
that the doctrine often turns on complex and hotly contested factual questions.288 Courts frequently muddle through this problem by classifying some
factual assertions as too speculative to support standing,289 while deferring to
plaintiﬀs’ allegations or government findings in other cases.290 We think that
courts should continue to take the plaintiﬀs’ legal theory as a given as long as it
is plausible—it is perfectly coherent to say that a particular plaintiﬀ is the right
party to assert a wrong proposition of law—but that some perusal of the facts is
inevitable.291 Abortion doctors might be so plentiful in a particular state that re-

285.

See, e.g., Redish & Joshi, supra note 284, at 1399-1403 (noting the burdens upon defendants
of having to conduct discovery of complicated factual issues of standing).
286. Cf. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (stating that
whether the plaintiﬀ could actually prove a statutory violation “goes to the merits”).
287. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (“Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.”).
288. See, e.g., Redish & Joshi, supra note 284 (exploring the problem). Standing is hardly unique
in this regard. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2013)) (recognizing
that determining whether the requirements for class certification have been met “will frequently entail ‘overlap with the merits of the plaintiﬀ ’s underlying claim’” (quoting Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011)); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
573 U.S. 258, 282-83 (2014) (holding that a securities fraud defendant may seek to defeat class
certification by proving that its statements had no impact on the stock price, notwithstanding
the fact that price impact is also an element on the merits).
289. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410-14 (2013) (emphasizing “our usual
reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors”); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1990) (rejecting standing
theory predicated on the probability of future judicial proceedings because “[i]t is just not
possible for a litigant to prove in advance that the judicial system will lead to any particular
result in his case”).
290. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-86
(2000).
291. By plausibility on the law, we mean something like the “substantiality” standard under Bell,
327 U.S. at 682-83, which bars jurisdictional dismissals of a plaintiﬀ ’s claim simply because it
is a loser on the merits unless the claim is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” See also HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 818-19 (discussing this standard). Problems arise even with
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strictions that aﬀect only some of them would not plausibly aﬀect women’s overall access to abortion, for example. In that case, the excluded doctors might lack
standing to assert their patients’ rights.292 Importantly, federal pleading standards have become more demanding in recent years, and the threshold determination of a claim’s factual plausibility that those standards require ought to suffice for our purposes.293
For this category of cases, the traditional relationship-plus-obstacle test will
generally not be relevant. In fact, the Court often seems not to apply that test to
regulated parties. But being law professors, we can imagine some hypotheticals
where the traditional criteria may still play a valuable role. The Court in Craig v.
Boren allowed a vendor of alcohol to raise the equal-protection rights of her male
customers to purchase beer on the same terms as female customers.294 But consider, for example, a local prohibition on alcohol sales that arguably violates the
rights of Catholic residents wishing to celebrate communion with the traditional
wine. An alcohol vendor could certainly establish an injury in fact from the law,
and limiting Catholics’ ability to buy wine plausibly burdens their free exercise
rights. Nonetheless, a court might worry that the wine vendor can shed little
direct light on the central issues in the case: the nature of the right holders’ religious practice, the possibility that the churches can obtain communion wine in
other ways, and whether the law makes enough exceptions for other parties that
it cannot be considered “generally applicable.”295

292.

293.

294.

295.

assuming the plaintiﬀ ’s legal theory is correct. See, e.g., Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823
F.3d 759, 770 n.10 (2d Cir. 2016) (“When assessing antitrust injury, we assume that the practice at issue is a violation of the antitrust laws, and are, thus, in the diﬃcult position of positing
a rationale for the antitrust laws’ prohibition of conduct that may, in fact, not be prohibited.”
(quoting Gatt Commc’ns, Inc. v. PMC Assocs., LLC, 711 F.3d 68, 76 n.9 (2d Cir. 2013))).
The patients would likewise have a standing problem, since they might struggle to show that
a restriction on a certain subset of doctors would cause any injury to them. But when right
holders sue, the Court has often fudged this sort of causation problem by reframing the necessary injury. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181-82 (holding that plaintiﬀs’ perception that
environments they valued and used had been injured was suﬃcient even if defendants’ activities had not actually caused any damage). In such an abortion case, a perceived narrowing of
the plaintiﬀs’ access or deterrence from exercising their right to choose might be suﬃcient.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain suﬃcient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).
Citing Dan Meltzer’s note, supra note 272, the Court reasoned that enforcement of the restriction against the vendor would undermine the rights of the third-party male customers.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-96 (1976).
Compare Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that generally applicable laws imposing incidental burdens on religious exercise are subject only to rational basis review), with
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (applying strict
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We would leave the door open for a court to conclude that a particular plaintiﬀ was so distant from the third parties whose rights it sought to assert that it
could not adequately litigate those rights, even if the defendant’s action against
the plaintiﬀ were alleged to violate them. Likewise, particularly where the right
holders are also subject to the challenged law, there might be so little impediment
to a suit by those right holders themselves that allowing third-party standing
would needlessly expand access to federal court. Precisely because the limitation
on third-party standing is generally prudential rather than mandated by Article
III,296 the doctrine has room to account for such considerations in appropriate
cases, even those involving regulated parties. But the strong presumption should
be that a party subject to a challenged action and suﬀering an injury in fact
should have standing to raise a third party’s rights if the challenged action
against the first party plausibly violates those rights.
B. Collaterally Injured Parties
Some third-party standing cases involve litigants who are not subject to the
challenged regulation or act, but who are nonetheless injured by it. Consider a
somewhat far-fetched example that one of us uses in class: a manufacturer of
flags loves flag-burning protesters because they require a constant supply of new
flags to burn. A new state law banning flag burning causes flag sales to drop
sharply. Assuming that the manufacturer can demonstrate an economic injury in
fact, can the manufacturer challenge the law by raising the free-speech rights of
the flag burners?297 Or consider a statutory case under the Sherman Act, in
which a supplier of goods to a business experiences injury when its customer

scrutiny to a local ban on slaughtering animals that burdened religious sacrifice because the
law made so many exceptions for secular activities). See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 429-30 (1961) (concluding that store employees lacked standing to challenge Sunday
closing laws on free-exercise grounds, even though the employees were subject to the laws,
because they “allege only economic injury to themselves; they do not allege any infringement
of their own religious freedoms due to Sunday closing” and “[t]hose persons whose religious
rights are allegedly impaired by the statutes are not without eﬀective ways to assert these
rights”).
296. See supra Section I.B.
297. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418-20 (1989) (striking down a state law prohibiting flag
burning under the First Amendment). For a real-life example, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 508-09 (1975), in which residents of a neighboring community claimed that a Rochester,
New York suburb’s exclusionary zoning practices discriminated against low-income persons,
thereby forcing such persons into the plaintiﬀs’ community and bringing about higher taxes
there. The Court characterized this claim as “an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.” Id. at 509.
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falls victim to anticompetitive conduct. Can the supplier invoke antitrust laws in
a suit against its customer’s competitor?298
We think the answer in this class of cases should generally be “no.” The
courts do, in fact, tend to deny third-party standing in such cases.299 In general,
the rule against third-party standing “assumes that the party with the right has
the appropriate incentive to challenge (or not challenge) governmental action
and to do so with the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation.”300 As we have
discussed, the concern that a litigant asserting the rights of third parties may not
be capable of adequately presenting those rights in a concrete factual setting is
less compelling when the application of the challenged law or government action
against the litigant would itself plausibly violate those rights. Requiring such a
violation ordinarily ensures that the litigant and the right holder will be tied
somewhat factually, as well as legally. But that is much less likely when the litigant is neither the right holder nor directly subject to the action he wishes to
challenge. Our flag manufacturer can present facts about the flag-burning law’s
damage to his business, but may not be able to tell us much about the specific
factual context in which his customers want to burn a flag.301
These concerns about concrete presentation are typically viewed from the
court’s perspective—that is, will the court get the information it needs to do a
good job resolving the case? But allowing a collaterally aﬀected litigant to stand
in for the actual right holder also raises a fairness concern. As Professor Brilmayer has explained, “we do not want the concerned citizen to litigate abstract
principles of constitutional law when the precedent established will govern
someone else’s . . . rights.”302 Although res judicata will not bind the actual right

298.

See SAS of P.R., Inc. v. P.R. Tel. Co., 48 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J.).
See Warth, 422 U.S. at 514; SAS, 48 F.3d at 44 (observing that “[i]n general such a supplier . . . is held not to have suﬀered ‘antitrust injury’; while there may be a violation and
causal harm to the supplier, the failed business is the immediate victim and the preferred
plaintiﬀ ”).
300. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004).
301. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408 (examining the record for evidence that flag burning might
have provoked a breach of the peace). We take it that most, if not all, proponents of the valid
rule idea would not think the flag manufacturer has a claim in our scenario. Those proponents
generally speak in terms of a right not to be “judged” by, Monaghan, supra note 79, at 3, “regulated” by, Monaghan, supra note 17, at 282, or “subjected to,” Fallon, supra note 17, at 1331, an
invalid rule of law. Our flag manufacturer is experiencing economic losses traceable to the
invalid anti-flag-burning law, but he is not judged by, regulated by, or subjected to that law.
We have not seen anyone argue that everyone has a right not to be injured in any way by legally
invalid action.
302. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 308 (1979).
299.
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holder in future litigation, the preclusive eﬀect of stare decisis is also significant.303 The general bar on third-party standing thus protects actual right holders from having their rights undermined by possibly irresponsible or inept litigants.
Extending to collaterally injured parties the standing to raise third-party
rights would also threaten broader separation-of-powers values. Proliferating
the set of persons who can challenge any given action makes challenges to government action more likely, with the concomitant risk of interbranch clashes. As
the Court has observed, broad third-party standing increases the risk that “the
courts might be ‘called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to
address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary
to protect individual rights.’”304 This sentiment is similar to John Marshall’s observation, when he was serving in the House of Representatives, that “[i]f the
judicial power extended to every question under the [C]onstitution” or “to every
question under the laws and treaties of the United States,” then “[t]he division of
power [among the branches of government] could exist no longer, and the other
departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary.”305
Given all this, the interesting question in collateral-injury cases may well be
whether such litigants should ever have standing to raise the rights of third parties. Put diﬀerently, should the traditional relationship-plus-obstacle test continue to provide an exception to the general ban on third-party standing in collateral-injury cases? We conclude that it should, because there will sometimes be
circumstances in which violations of federal law are likely to persist unless those
suﬀering collateral injuries are allowed to sue.306 But we think these situations
are likely to be rare and that the general presumption should be against this sort
of standing.
Some cases are likely to be close calls under the relationship-plus-obstacle
test. Consider, for example, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,307 which allowed a private

303.

Cf. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2003)
(“[W]hen viewed from the perspective of an individual litigant, stare decisis often functions
like the doctrine of issue preclusion—it precludes the relitigation of issues decided in earlier
cases.”).
304. Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500).
305. 4 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95 (Charles T. Cullen & Leslie Tobias eds., 1984).
306. Cf. Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1197 (2014) (“Relative standing . . . fulfills a practical purpose consistent with deeply rooted principles of judicial legitimacy: federal courts may adjudicate a dispute when doing so is necessary to remedy a violation of law.”).
307. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

58

unpacking third-party standing

school to assert the rights of parents to control their children’s education in challenging a state criminal law requiring all parents to send their children to public
school. The law regulated the parents, not the school; the school’s injury was
collateral, albeit concrete. Justice McReynolds’s terse opinion oﬀered no reason
to believe that the parents could not sue on their own, and any parent prosecuted
under the law could certainly raise their constitutional rights as a defense. The
best argument for third-party standing emphasizes that individual parents’ suits
might establish a right to send their children to private school in vain, if the law
succeeded in putting all such schools out of business.308 But that problem could
potentially be solved by a more limited authorization of third-party standing,
which might allow the parent to seek an injunction against enforcement of the
law throughout the state.309
The case for third-party standing in Singleton v. Wulﬀ310 is similarly debatable. That decision allowed abortion providers to challenge the denial of Medicaid
benefits to their patients for abortions, even though the law did not regulate the
doctors’ conduct.311 Moreover, the Medicaid patients themselves could well have
pursued their own claims (including through a class action) and could have
shielded their privacy through the use of pseudonyms, as in Roe v. Wade.312 Notably, only a plurality of the Court signed on to the third-party standing analysis.
That said, even the dissenting Justices in that case accepted that third-party
standing should sometimes be allowed for collaterally injured parties; they simply
argued for limiting it to situations in which the right holder is unable, as a practical matter, to vindicate his or her own rights.313

308.

309.
310.
311.

312.

313.

See TRIBE, supra note 15, § 3-19, at 439.
See infra text accompanying notes 389-395 (explaining how broad injunctions can implicate
third-party standing doctrine).
428 U.S. 106 (1976).
Because the law limited the reimbursement payments that doctors could receive for their services, however, they were arguably more “subject to” the regulation than in most collateralinjury cases. As this case illustrates, there may be situations in which the line between regulated-party situations and mere collateral-injury situations becomes less distinct.
410 U.S. 113 (1973); see TRIBE, supra note 15, § 3-19, at 444-45 (noting these options in Singleton). No decision cited by the Singleton plurality had allowed standing based on a mere collateral injury. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the laws operated directly against the plaintiﬀs,
and enforcement arguably would violate others’ constitutional rights. The same can be said
for Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), in which an owner of real estate subject to a racially
restrictive covenant was allowed to defend against a suit for breach of the covenant on the
ground that enforcing it would violate the equal-protection rights of African American purchasers.
See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 126 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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A potentially better example of appropriate, collateral-injury-based thirdparty standing is Powers v. Ohio.314 The Court there allowed a white criminal
defendant to raise the rights of African Americans excluded from jury service.
Critically, Powers featured strong arguments that constitutional injuries would
persist if third-party standing were not allowed. As the Court explained:
Potential jurors are not parties to the jury selection process and have no
opportunity to be heard at the time of their exclusion. Nor can excluded
jurors easily obtain declaratory or injunctive relief when discrimination
occurs through an individual prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges. . . . And, there exist considerable practical barriers to suit by the
excluded juror because of the small financial stake involved and the economic burdens of litigation.315
Because of situations like this one, third-party standing for collaterally injured
parties should not be completely disallowed. But such cases are not likely to be
common. We can also imagine cases in which the relationship between the litigant and the right holder is so strong by itself as to make a persuasive case for
third-party standing. But cases where this relationship is the central consideration in the standing analysis are best viewed under our third category of thirdparty standing cases, to which we now turn.
C. Representative Parties
Perhaps because they tend to fall more within the expertise of civil procedure
scholars rather than federal courts or constitutional law scholars, representativestanding cases have not generally been part of the third-party standing conversation, but they should be. We consider two kinds of representative standing
here. In the first category, one party stands in for another, litigating the same
claim that the other party might have pursued. Examples include parents suing
as next friends for their children and organizations suing on behalf of their members. In the second category, one or more persons with first-party claims of their
own seek to aggregate their claims with those of many others. Class actions are
the obvious instance, but others include MDLs and broad injunctions extending
beyond the parties to a lawsuit. All of these scenarios raise third-party problems
because they ask a court to adjudicate the rights of persons who are not, at least
as a practical matter, actually before it. And they raise concerns similar to those
raised by more familiar forms of third-party standing regarding the courts’ abil-

314.

315.
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499 U.S. 400 (1991).
Id. at 414-15.
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ity to decide disputes eﬀectively and to safeguard the rights and interests of absent persons. Most generally, representative standing displays the continuing
tension between the private-dispute-resolution and public-rights models of adjudication.
There are, nonetheless, important diﬀerences between representative standing and our other two categories. One diﬀerence is that some representatives
seek to assert not only a third party’s rights, but also their injury in fact. In this
scenario, as we have already discussed, third-party standing takes on a constitutional as well as a prudential dimension.316 The law has not fully come to grips
with this diﬀerence, and Article III may warrant further limits on third-party
standing in such circumstances. A second diﬀerence is that, in the aggregation
scenario, the litigants generally (but not always) assert their own rights and injuries that parallel those of the parties they seek to represent. We contend that
one litigant’s eﬀort to represent another raises third-party concerns even if that
litigant has a similar claim of their own. And finally, well-developed frameworks
already exist for handling some of the forms of representation—such as Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class actions—wholly outside
the framework of standing. In some areas, such as next-friend status, those
frames essentially replicate the traditional standing criteria of relationship plus
obstacle. But in others, such as organizational standing and broad injunctive relief, we contend that the existing doctrine needs to take better account of thirdparty standing concerns.
1. Direct Stand-Ins
Take the stand-ins first. As with all potential third-party standing problems,
it will help to begin by unpacking who has first-party claims and who must rely
on a third-party’s rights. Consider, for example, the Court’s discussion of qui
tam suits under the False Claims Act in the Stevens case.317 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court discounted the notion that qui tam relators could rest their
standing on the fact that they stood to benefit financially if the claim prevailed.318
Rather, the Court invoked “the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing

316.

See supra Section I.B.
317. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000). Qui tam statutes
authorize a private party (the “relator”) to bring suit on behalf of the public and receive a
portion of the government’s recovery. The False Claims Act is the most prominent modern
example, but qui tam litigation dates back to the Founding. See id. at 768-69 & n.1.
318. The Court noted that “the same might be said of someone who has placed a wager upon the
outcome.” Id. at 772. Hence, “an interest that is merely a ‘byproduct’ of the suit itself cannot
give rise to a cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes.” Id. at 773.
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to assert the injury in fact suﬀered by the assignor.”319 It was thus suﬃcient that
the False Claims Act “can reasonably be regarded as eﬀecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.”320 The Court cited a variety of cases
in which it had “routinely entertained” suits brought by assignees.321
Stevens fits comfortably with other aspects of American law treating rights to
sue as transferable property interests. Some rights of action pass to a decedent’s
heirs, for example, and existing causes of action belonging to a debtor are considered property belonging to the bankruptcy estate.322 In all these situations,
transferring the underlying property interest gives the assignee a first-party right
to litigate the case arising under it. But focusing on what is assigned and what is
not can help unravel diﬃcult questions about assignments’ scope and implications. The False Claims Act, for instance, both assigns the government’s underlying right to be free from fraud (and the corresponding injury in fact caused by
the defendant’s actions) and creates a statutory right for the qui tam relator to
pursue a remedy.323 But such assignments do not confer the assignor’s status on
the private litigant. This suggests not only that the government may not transfer
its sovereign interest in enforcing the law, but also that other advantages that the
United States has as a litigant—such as exemption from any sovereign-immunity defense when it sues a state government—generally do not convey.324

319.

320.
321.

322.

323.
324.
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Id. at 773.
Id.
See id. at 773-74 (first citing Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 465 (1962);
then citing Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 829 (1950); and
then citing Hubbard v. Tod, 171 U.S. 474, 475 (1898)); see also Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC
Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 275 (2008) (“Assignees of a claim, including assignees for collection,
have long been permitted to bring suit.”).
See, e.g., Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 98-100 (Tex. 1997) (discussing the survival of tort
claims); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54 (1982) (noting
that causes of action belonging to a debtor are treated as property of the bankrupt estate).
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), (d) (2018).
See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 787 (leaving this question open). The Supreme Court did recently
hold, in PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 2244 (2021), that the federal government’s delegation of its eminent-domain power to a private company also confers the government’s right to disregard state sovereign immunity when that company seeks to condemn
property belonging to the state. But the majority opinion in that case focused so resolutely on
the unique history and structure of the federal eminent domain power, see id. at 2254-57, 225961, that we doubt PennEast can be read as a general holding that the federal government can
delegate its exemption from state sovereign immunity to private litigants. Such a holding
would, after all, provide an easy end-run around the holdings of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996), and Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020), among other cases, which stated
that state sovereign immunity ordinarily bars damages suits against state governments by
private litigants asserting federal statutory claims.
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Nor do cases like Stevens suggest that one can assign one’s right to raise particular arguments in a lawsuit. We doubt, for instance, that the doctors in June
Medical Services could have avoided any third-party problems by obtaining a formal assignment of their patients’ right to invoke their abortion rights. One can
assign certain proprietary interests and thus the right to raise legal claims arising
from injury to those interests, but no blanket right exists for any party to pass
any claim or argument that they have standing to raise to any other party, simply
by executing an assignment.325 Otherwise the third-party standing doctrine
would become a matter of paperwork.
Existing doctrine rightly treats two other representative relationships—next
friends and agents—as raising third-party rather than first-party rights. Nextfriend status has generally been limited to situations in which someone is representing either a minor or a person who is alleged to lack suﬃcient mental capacity or other ability to represent themselves. One context in which claims of nextfriend status arise with some frequency is habeas corpus litigation on behalf of
detained prisoners.326 The common law permitted next-friend suits for prisoners as far back as the seventeenth century, and the federal habeas statute now
explicitly authorizes them.327 In theory, next friends do not assert third-party
standing because they are not parties at all; “[a] ‘next friend’ does not himself
become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply
pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party
in interest.”328 But this is just a legal fiction. In practice, the next friend initiates
the suit, asserts the prisoner’s rights, and controls the litigation. Indeed, many

325.

The closest the Court has come to endorsing such a broadly permissive assignment rule is the
5-4 decision in Sprint, which held that a party contractually bound to return the entire recovery
to the assignor nonetheless has standing to pursue the claim. See 554 U.S. at 271. The majority
relied entirely on the common-law practice of exercising jurisdiction over such claims. See id.
at 274-85. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent found this practice equivocal and contested. See id.
at 302 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“We have never approved federal-court jurisdiction over a
claim where the entire relief requested will run to a party not before the court.”). Sprint’s reasoning was too closely tied to specific historical practice in a narrow class of debt-collection
suits to establish any general principle applicable to, say, claims for other remedies, assignments of sovereign interests, or transfers of rights to raise particular legal arguments.
326. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 162 (1990). Next-friend standing issues have also
arisen in habeas cases relating to the “war on terror,” when individuals or groups have sought
to litigate the rights of detainees, many of whom are held in locations that make litigation
impracticable. See Caroline Nasrallah Belk, Note, Next Friend Standing and the War on Terror,
53 DUKE L.J. 1747, 1759-67 (2004).
327. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 162; 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2018). The 1948 revision “follow[ed] the
actual practice of the courts.” Revisers’ Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2018). Rule 17 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure also allows next friends to sue on behalf of minors and those who
lack competence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
328. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163.
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next-friend cases involve litigants wishing to prevent the execution of death row
inmates against the inmates’ own expressed wishes.329
Although the Court does not explicitly treat next friendship as third-party
standing, the doctrine replicates traditional third-party standing requirements—
only with greater rigor:
First, a “next friend” must provide an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real
party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.
Second, the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the best interests of
the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and . . . a “next friend”
must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.330
There must, in other words, be an obstacle to the third party asserting their own
rights, and a relationship between the third party and the litigant. But both
prongs seem to be enforced considerably more strictly than in standard thirdparty cases.
The agency cases, by contrast, show less explicit concern for obstacles, but
insist on legally sanctioned relationships ensuring the accountability of an agent
to its principal. In Stevens, the Court mused that “[i]t would perhaps suﬃce to
say that the relator . . . is simply the statutorily designated agent of the United
States.”331 The Court quickly concluded however, that “[t]his analysis is precluded . . . by the fact that the statute gives the relator himself an interest in the
lawsuit, and not merely the right to retain a fee out of the recovery.”332 The government’s ability to designate private agents to assert the government’s rights
came up again thirteen years later in Hollingsworth v. Perry.333 California law permitted the proponents of a successful ballot initiative to step in and defend that
initiative’s validity in subsequent litigation if state oﬃcials were unwilling to do
so.334 Nonetheless, when state oﬃcials decided not to appeal a federal-court
judgment striking down Proposition 8 (a state constitutional amendment bar-

329.

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

64

See, e.g., id. at 152; Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 737 (1990); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S.
1012, 1012-13 (1976).
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64.
Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000).
Id.
570 U.S. 693 (2013).
See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011) (so construing the California state constitution
and elections code).
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ring same-sex marriage), the Supreme Court held that the amendment’s proponents lacked Article III standing to appeal that judgment.335 California’s delegation of a right to defend ballot propositions to their proponents was missing “the
most basic features of an agency relationship,” including “the principal’s right to
control the agent’s actions.”336 The most recent agency case, Virginia House of
Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,337 likewise found that no agency relationship had been
created, but the Court acknowledged that a state government may designate an
agent to stand in for its interests.338
The Court thus recognizes the legitimacy of representation by agents in principle, and it plainly understands agency relationships as raising third-party
standing concerns.339 So far, the Court has focused on the relationship between
principals and agents, insisting that the delegation be reflected in positive law
and include mechanisms for holding agents accountable for their conduct of the
litigation. It has not addressed whether there must also be some obstacle to principals suing in their own right, perhaps deferring to implicit legislative judgments in the statutes creating such relationships that they are necessary to protect the government’s interests.340 Nor has the Court addressed the extent to
which governments may delegate their interests to purely private litigants or
whether private actors can delegate their own rights to other persons. The potential scope of this exception to the third-party rule, as well as that exception’s
potential to broadly ground public-rights litigation, thus remains much in
doubt.341

335.

336.
337.
338.
339.

340.

341.

Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 715.
Id. at 713 (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(1) (AM. L. INST. 2005)).
139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019).
See id. at 1951.
See Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 708 (invoking the principle that “a litigant . . . cannot rest a
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” and inquiring as to the applicability of “certain, limited exceptions” where courts “have allowed litigants to assert the interests of others” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991))).
As Justice Kennedy pointed out in Hollingsworth, for example, California’s delegation of authority to defend a ballot proposition to its proponents reflected concerns that elected oﬃcials
would have strong incentives not to defend such propositions—which are, after all, designed
to bypass those same oﬃcials. See 570 U.S. at 716 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that California “deems such an appearance essential to the integrity of its initiative process”).
See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315, 360-67 (2001) (suggesting that agency representation
has broad potential to support public-law litigation). If the new Texas abortion statute mentioned in the introduction to this Article, which confers a right on private parties to enforce
the state’s substantive restrictions on abortion, see supra note 14, is defended on an agency
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The more fundamental question regarding agents, next friends, and other
representative parties is whether they can invoke not only a third party’s rights,
but also its injury. As already discussed, this scenario implicates not only prudential concerns but constitutional ones as well. Injury in fact is, after all, part of
the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III standing.342 We are unaware of any traditional third-party standing cases in which the Court has permitted a litigant to assert a third party’s injury as well as its own rights. And in
Hollingsworth, the Court doubted that “mere authorization to represent a third
party’s interest is suﬃcient to confer Article III standing on private parties with
no injury of their own.”343 This worry reflects an important diﬀerence between
the assignment and agency theories in Stevens: an assignment transfers an underlying interest, denial of which may create Article III injury in fact, whereas an
agency relationship confers only the principal’s right to enforce a legal claim, not
that underlying interest. But the Court has never really focused on the distinction.
The Court should make clear that the third-party standing doctrine, and its
exceptions, are prudential precisely because they address the rights, claims, and
arguments that parties may assert in litigation—not the irreducible minimum of
constitutional injury. The latter is a separate requirement, and even a party who
can show a strong relationship to a third party and a formidable obstacle to that
party’s assertion of their own rights must nonetheless have an injury in fact of
their own. Insisting that representative litigants have their own injuries would
theory, its validity may turn on the extent to which state oﬃcials retain oversight over enforcement actions. But since the statute provides for suits in state court, applicability of the
analysis oﬀered here will depend on the extent to which the Texas courts choose to interpret
the state constitution’s standing requirement in line with cases like Hollingsworth. See, e.g.,
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444, 446-48 (Tex. 1993) (stating
that a standing requirement “is implicit in the open courts provision” of the Texas Constitution, and adopting several aspects of federal standing law in construing that requirement (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13)); see also Grossman v. Wolfe, 578 S.W.3d 250, 256-57 (Tex. App.
2019) (noting that Texas cases recognize broad legislative authority to exempt plaintiﬀs from
the standing requirement when creating a statutory right of action). Whether the substantive
abortion restrictions in the law violate the Federal Constitution is, of course, a federal question
upon which the U.S. Supreme Court would have the final say. And whether or not a private
plaintiﬀ enforcing the Texas law would have standing to carry an appeal of that issue before
the U.S. Supreme Court, see Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (per curiam), a statecourt defendant would surely have standing to seek U.S. Supreme Court review of an adverse
state-court judgment upholding the Texas law, see ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 61224 (1989); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 60, at 158-59.
342. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
343. Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 710; see also id. at 715 (“States cannot alter [the federal courts’ limited] role simply by issuing to private parties who otherwise lack standing a ticket to the federal courthouse.”).
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not entail a large practical change in the law, but it would have some important
implications.
First, next-friend standing should be limited to those whose relationship to
the right holder is suﬃciently close such that the alleged infringement of that
person’s rights causes the litigant injury in fact. As a practical matter, this covers
most successful next friends.344 A parent, family member, or close friend of a
person unlawfully imprisoned or facing execution, for instance, can generally
assert an injury to their own valuable relationship with the right holder.345 An
injury requirement will tend to weed out putative next friends whose motivations are primarily moral or ideological, but the courts have generally rejected
those claims anyway.346 More fundamentally, screening out such “non-Hohfeldian” plaintiﬀs has been a central thrust of modern standing doctrine.347
Second, insisting on injury would not prevent delegations such as the one in
Hollingsworth, so long as they meet the rigorous criteria for an actual agency relationship set out in that opinion. The California law should be understood as
conferring the functional equivalent of a right of action on proponents of ballot
initiatives (albeit one to be exercised in a defensive capacity). This would overcome prudential objections to third-party standing, and in any event it creates
the requisite relationship to support an exception to that doctrine. Contrary to
the majority’s suggestion that Hollingsworth lacked a “personal stake” in the litigation,348 his stake compares rather favorably to what the Court has found suf-

344.

345.
346.

347.

348.

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13 n.3 (1955) (evaluating a habeas
petition brought by the sister of a civilian ex-serviceman held in Korea).
See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 9 (2004) (recognizing parents’
first-party interests in associating with the child or in controlling the child’s upbringing).
See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 607 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the eﬀort of a public
defender and a private citizen who had never met the detainee to serve as detainee’s next
friends); Coal. of Clergy, Laws., & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting a similar eﬀort by a coalition of law professors and other professionals); see also
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164 (1990) (“It was not intended that the writ of habeas
corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling
themselves next friends.” (citing United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d
Cir. 1921)). Some lower courts, however, have been more permissive. See, e.g., Sam M. ex rel.
Elliott v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77, 91 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that “a significant relationship need
not be required as a prerequisite to Next Friend status”).
“Hohfeldian” plaintiﬀs seek to litigate rights that are personal to them, whereas “nonHohfeldian” plaintiﬀs seek to litigate societal interests. See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); cf. WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook
ed., 1923) (developing influential terminology for describing legal rights and related concepts).
Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 707.
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ficient in other cases, such as the “informational injury” in Akins. Both cases involved litigants invoking a broadly held interest, but whose personal activities
had established a uniquely close connection to the controversy that set them
apart from the general public.349
The most important change, however, might be to a well-established standin: organizations and associations that sue on behalf of their members. Under
longstanding doctrine, an association or membership organization may sue on
behalf of its members so long as “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to
the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”350 The
third requirement tends to rule out claims for damages relief, as individual members will generally need to appear as parties to establish their damages.351 Germaneness means simply that the Sierra Club, for example, generally may not
bring cases about abortion and the National Abortion Rights Action League cannot bring cases about the environment. Hence, organizations can generally assert
the rights of their members whenever any member would have standing to
sue.352
The Wright & Miller treatise describes organizational standing as a “clear illustration” of the notion that “[s]pecial relationships to an injured person” may
justify representational standing.353 But some relationships between organizations and their members may be more special than others. The American Association of Retired Persons has nearly thirty-eight million members—roughly the
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Compare FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (noting the plaintiﬀ ’s particular connection to
the controversy over whether the specific disclosures at issue should be made), with Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 719 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (observing that initiative proponents
“have a unique relationship to the voter-approved measure that makes them especially likely
to be reliable and vigorous advocates for the measure” (quoting Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002,
1152 (Cal. 2011))).
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1975).
See Warth, 422 U.S. at 511 (“Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have
standing solely as the representative of its members.”). For a decision allowing a psychiatric
organization to invoke the third-party standing of its member psychiatrists to assert the rights
of their patients, see Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society v. Green Spring Health Services, Inc., 280
F.3d 278, 293 (3d Cir. 2002). See also Tacy F. Flint, A New Brand of Representational Standing,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1039-41 (2003) (discussing the decision).
13A RICHARD D. FREER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.9.1
(3d ed. April 2020).
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same size as the State of California.354 The National Rifle Association has millions of members, as does the Sierra Club.355 It seems a stretch to conclude categorically that organizations always have a suﬃciently “special” or “close” relationship to their members to represent their interests adequately .
The more fundamental problem, however, is that organizations need show
no injury in fact of their own.356 They must identify a particular member who
has an injury, but nothing requires any particular participation by that member,
and it is far from clear that members are bound by any adverse judgment against
the organization.357 It is unclear why, in these circumstances, an organization
should be able to rely on its member’s injury to establish Article III standing.
The Court has rejected other challenges to organizational standing on the
ground that “an association suing to vindicate the interests of its members can
draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital”; moreover, “‘organizations often have specialized expertise and research resources . . . that individual plaintiﬀs lack.’”358 But such prudential advantages cannot overcome a constitutional objection.
One may ask how diﬀerent letting a vast public-interest organization designate one of its millions of members who could have sued in their own right is
354.

355.
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Compare Social Impact, AM. ASS’N RETIRED PERS., https://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/company/social-impact [https://perma.cc/362Y-GFS3] (claiming “nearly 38 million members”),
with Quick Facts, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact
/table/CA/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/GK84-2QQ7] (estimating that the population of
California was 39,512,223 as of July 1, 2019).
See
Membership,
NAT’L
RIFLE
ASS’N,
https://membership.nra.org/FAQ
[https://perma.cc/5AHU-YR2E] (claiming that the NRA “is made up of nearly five million
members”); Who We Are, SIERRA CLUB, https://www.sierraclub.org/about
[https://perma.cc/26PP-LGP7] (estimating that Sierra Club includes 3.8 million members
and supporters).
Membership organizations sometimes do assert direct harms to their own institutional interests. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1982). Those injuries
will generally satisfy Article III, leaving only prudential concerns about raising third-party
rights. But organizational standing does not depend on the existence of these first-party injuries.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008) (noting the “principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in
a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party
by service of process” (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940))); 18A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4456 (3d ed. 2021) (“The
decisions that recognize [organizational] standing have not yet grappled with the preclusion
questions that are bound to follow. . . . [G]reat care should be taken before binding all members to an association loss.”).
Int’l Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986) (quoting Dale Gronemeier, Note, From Net to
Sword: Organizational Representatives Litigating Their Members’ Claims, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 663,
669).
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from simply allowing well-resourced litigants to sue on behalf of the public interest.359 By largely replicating the public action, organizational standing puts
pressure on separation-of-powers principles limiting the role of courts. To be
sure, it is unlikely that much would change if organizations were required to join
at least one member as an actual party. Presumably, that change would also entail
a requirement that the individual plaintiﬀ play a meaningful role in the litigation.360 It would probably be easy, in most cases, for a large advocacy organization to find some member willing to serve and participate as a named plaintiﬀ.
Nonetheless, the law of standing has often imposed requirements that seem to
make little practical diﬀerence in the interests of maintaining contact between
the realities of modern litigation and the private-law model that has, in our tradition, justified the courts’ power of judicial review.361 Consistent with that effort, organizational standing should be brought more firmly in line with the rest
of the Court’s case law.
2. Aggregation Mechanisms
In contemporary litigation, the problem of representation often marches arm
in arm with the problem of aggregation. Public-law litigation challenging government practices frequently seeks to join thousands of similarly situated persons rather than just a few interested litigants. And private-law litigation—such
as tort litigation over tobacco or opioids—takes on a public cast as it aggregates
many thousands of individual claims.362 It seems fair to say that the eﬃcient,
fair, and eﬀective aggregation of diﬀuse interests is the central problem of modern procedure.363 The law has developed a wide array of mechanisms to address
this problem, including class actions, MDLs, and nationwide injunctions.
Aggregate cases diﬀer from the stand-in scenarios already discussed in an
obvious respect: at the center of each is a plaintiﬀ with a first-party claim. Named
359.

See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972) (recognizing that “once review is properly
invoked, [a litigant] may argue the public interest”); Heather Elliott, Associations and Cities as
(Forbidden) Pure Private Attorneys General, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1329, 1383 (2020) (questioning whether associational standing can be squared with contemporary standing doctrine).
360. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (rejecting jurisdiction where the plaintiﬀ ’s lawyers had no meaningful contact with their client).
361. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (indicating that plaintiﬀs could
have established an injury in fact if they had only alleged “concrete plans” to visit the animals
threatened by the challenged action); Morton, 405 U.S. at 735 (suggesting that the Sierra Club
need only identify a member who had visited the threatened wilderness area).
362. See, e.g., PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL
POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 24 (2015) (discussing the public regulatory eﬀects
of state governments’ tort suits against tobacco companies).
363. See, e.g., Lemos & Young, supra note 85, at 109; Nagareda, supra note 83, at 1872-79.
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plaintiﬀs in class actions, cases joined in an MDL, and lawsuits seeking broad
injunctive relief all begin with the experiences of one or more first-party claimants whose claims are supposedly similar to those of many other litigants. But
each mechanism eﬀectively allows that set of first-party claimants to assert the
rights, and thus represent the interests, of those other litigants. The rights of
these others—absent class members, MDL plaintiﬀs not chosen for the plaintiﬀs’
steering committee or bellwether trial, and persons covered by injunctive relief
that they are not parties to—may be identical in substance to those the primary
plaintiﬀs assert on their own behalf. The fact remains, however, that they are not
the same claims, and the various parties may have quite diverse circumstances,
interests, and intentions. These mechanisms can thus fruitfully be viewed as
raising problems of third-party standing.
Start with class actions. Professor Monaghan observed a half-century ago
that, “[p]erhaps more than any other single development, the mushrooming of
class actions has rendered the private rights model largely unintelligible.”364 In a
sense, a properly certified class action raises no third-party problem. Under the
commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,365 the named plaintiﬀ has the same injury in fact and asserts the same
rights on his own behalf that other class members assert. But the fact remains
that class members other than the named plaintiﬀs are not actually present, and
the named plaintiﬀs litigate the suit on their behalf. And even if the named plaintiﬀs have precisely the same claims as their absent compatriots, those injuries
and claims are typically diﬀerentiated rather than collective.366 Named plaintiﬀs
assert first-party standing as to their own claims, and third-party standing as to
the claims of the rest of the class.
If we think of class actions as raising a third-party standing problem, then
we can also think of Rule 23’s requirements as an echo of the traditional relationship-plus-obstacle test. The numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1), as well as
the requirements of inconsistencies arising from individual adjudications in Rule
23(b)(1) or the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), all speak to why the
absent class members cannot reasonably be expected to sue in their own right.
And Rule 23(a)(4)’s requirement that “the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class,” as well as the various notice and
opt-out provisions in Rule 23(c), tend to ensure that named plaintiﬀs (and their
364.

Monaghan, supra note 51, at 1383.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)-(3).
366. See, e.g., TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2202 (2021) (involving a class action
aggregating claims of breaches of the Fair Credit Reporting Act as to particular individuals);
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 743-45 (1984) (involving a class action aggregating claims that
lax enforcement of tax rules had hindered the ability of particular African American families
to receive a nonsegregated education in public schools).
365.
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lawyers) have and maintain the right sort of relationship with the rest of the
class.367 As with the rules limiting next-friend and agency standing, these requirements tend to be considerably more rigorous than their family relations in
the traditional law of third-party standing.
The third-party problem becomes more acute in two scenarios. One arises
when a class action includes absent parties whose claims are actually quite different from those of the named plaintiﬀ. For example, in TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez,368 the named plaintiﬀ experienced significant actual damages from a
breach of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, but the district court certified a broad
class of persons, including thousands who suﬀered a similar breach but, on the
evidence presented, no similar harm. The Supreme Court held that Article III
standing was appropriate only for those class members who had been concretely
harmed by the breach—in particular, by having false credit reports concerning
them disseminated to third-party businesses—a group that constituted less than
one-fourth of the total class.369 By eliminating from the class those absent plaintiﬀs whose claims diﬀered in kind from Ramirez’s, the Court obviated the most
dramatic third-party problem. But questions about the propriety of third-party
standing may remain where diﬀerences within the class implicate goals or strategy rather than the ability to sue at all.370
The second scenario arises if, as current doctrine permits, named plaintiﬀs
continue to represent the class even after their own claims become moot.371 In
that circumstance, named plaintiﬀs piggyback on third-parties’ injury in fact, as
well as their legal rights. The Court has advanced prudential arguments for letting such a named plaintiﬀ continue to litigate on the class’s behalf.372 But as in
the next-friend context, it is far from clear that such arguments can suﬃce without a constitutional injury in fact.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the relatively elaborate safeguards of Rule
23 make class actions, in comparison with other mechanisms, the gold standard
of aggregate litigation. In recent years, however, class actions have been eclipsed
367.
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370.

371.
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in many settings by MDLs.373 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation can create an MDL whenever “civil actions involving one or
more common questions of fact are pending in diﬀerent districts.”374 In so doing,
the Panel transfers all the cases raising those common questions to a single district (that it selects) “for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,” so
long as “transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and will promote the just and eﬃcient conduct of such actions.”375
This sort of consolidation has created cases of tremendous national significance.
The MDL consolidated before Judge Polster in the Northern District of Ohio,
for example, has become the central venue in which the American legal system
seeks to deal with the national crisis of opioid addiction.376
In 2018, MDLs accounted for 51.9 percent of all pending federal civil cases.377
In theory, MDLs are comprised of individual lawsuits involving individual plaintiﬀs that are simply consolidated for purposes of conducting pretrial proceedings.378 But in reality, MDL judges view their central mission as facilitating settlement of all the claims; consolidated cases almost never return to their original
districts for trial.379 Presiding judges create plaintiﬀ steering committees to represent the interests of all plaintiﬀs, and they hold “bellwether” trials to allow the
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parties to test the general strength of representative claims as a prelude to settlement negotiations.380
Like class actions, MDLs create a third-party standing problem to the extent
that the litigation is driven and controlled by one group of parties—those parties
directly represented on the plaintiﬀs’ steering committee—who assert the right
to represent the interests of many others who take no direct part. To be sure,
MDLs are unlike class actions in that parties are not legally bound by the aggregate resolution; if the steering committee negotiates a settlement with defendants, for example, individual claimants may still opt out. But given the practical
objective of reaching a global settlement, MDL settlements are often structured
to maximize pressures for individual plaintiﬀs to accept the deal.381 Individuals
are taxed for the steering committee’s expenses, and they are eﬀectively bound
by the aggregate resolution whether or not they have any opportunity to participate in guiding the litigation.382
From this perspective, then, MDLs allow a subset of litigants to assert the
rights of third parties without either a formal mechanism to ensure a close relationship to those parties383 or, typically, a conventional determination that the
third parties could not litigate their claims on their own.384 So long as the consolidated cases involve “one or more common questions of fact,”385 there is no
legal requirement that the claimants driving the litigation through the steering
committee, or those selected for “bellwether” trials, be “typical” as in class actions. The opioid MDL, for example, is primarily composed of cities, counties,
and states asserting claims for medical expenditures, but it also includes class-
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action claims brought on behalf of infants born addicted.386 Although an extensive body of “lore” on best practices has built up around MDLs,387 no binding
rules analogous to Rule 23 for class actions exist to ensure that third-party rights
are adequately represented.388 This is true notwithstanding that MDL outcomes
are far more binding, as a practical matter, than the litigation outcomes of ordinary representation of third-party rights. If the doctors had lost in June Medical
Services, for instance, that would have constituted a bad precedent for their patients, but those patients would have remained free to challenge the law in subsequent litigation.
A final example, which we can only sketch the outlines of here, concerns nationwide injunctions. Such injunctions became a common feature of high-profile
public-law litigation challenging policies of both the Obama and Trump Administrations,389 and they show no signs of slowing down under the Biden Administration.390 Debate about such injunctions has focused on their history (or lack
thereof) in American precedent,391 their grounding in historical equity practice,392 and their practical necessity.393 But they can also be viewed through the
lens of third-party standing. The Court insists that “‘a plaintiﬀ must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press’ and ‘for each form of relief’ that
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is sought.”394 This suggests that, although plaintiﬀs may seek an injunction protecting themselves from unlawful conduct, they may need to establish a distinct
basis for seeking an injunction to protect others—especially the entire universe
of persons aﬀected by the challenged policy. Absent the use of a class action,
standing to protect those other persons would depend, at least in part, on the
law of third-party standing.395 It may well be that some nationwide injunctions
could be defended in these terms, and we lack space here to explore the issue in
any depth. Our point is simply that the law of aggregate remedies intersects with
third-party standing and representative litigation.
As class actions decline, MDLs and suits for nationwide injunctions have
come to dominate American public litigation. Unlike class actions, next friends,
or agency relationships, MDLs and broad injunctions are largely creatures of discretion. The barebones MDL statute and the broad powers of traditional equity
leave judges with little guidance or constraint in permitting some parties to represent others with whom they may have no relationship and little common interest. This is not the place for a comprehensive discussion of how any of these
representative mechanisms should be governed, and it may be that some reforms
will need to come from Congress rather than from the courts. We do submit,
however, that understanding these situations as raising third-party standing
problems and applying the principles developed here can help. In particular, considering the strength of the relationship between litigants and other right holders, the extent to which innovative mechanisms are necessary to overcome obstacles to parties asserting their own rights, and the extent to which actions
aﬀecting the primary litigant may also violate the rights of others are valuable
starting points in areas lacking many other legal landmarks.
conclusion
We have oﬀered a framework that we hope will make the third-party standing doctrine more useful and coherent, for both statutory and constitutional
claims, while remaining faithful to modern standing doctrine’s eﬀort to reconcile
the public and private models of adjudication. The first element is to determine
more clearly the boundaries of first-party rights, something that is often blurred
in the cases and commentary. As we have explained, that determination must
attend to the distinction between the ability to invoke a right in litigation and a
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private right of action. The zone-of-interests test, we contend, oﬀers a useful
guide for determining the scope of the former, and part of our aim is to rescue
that concept as a switching principle post-Lexmark. Those who do not fall within
the zone of interests will need to rely on third-party standing in order to invoke
the right.
Once “true” third-party standing is identified, we have argued that it is a
mistake to try to rationalize it as a unitary doctrine—such as by insisting that it
is always subject to the obstacle-plus-relationship test or by positing a general
right not to be subject to an invalid rule. Our inquiry instead unpacks third-party
standing cases into three categories. In the first, litigants are regulated by or subject to the action that they challenge, but seek to invoke the rights of third parties
who have a stronger legal claim against it. In these cases, we contend that litigants should normally be allowed to raise third-party rights when the enforcement of the law against them plausibly violates the rights of those third parties.
The second category involves litigants who are not regulated by or subject to the
challenged action, but collaterally injured by it. These litigants, we argue, should
presumptively lack third-party standing, unless they can make a particularly
strong showing under the obstacle-plus-relationship test.
We have also identified a third category that the existing literature on thirdparty standing has largely ignored. These are cases in which a litigant represents
another party whose rights have arguably been violated. Cases in this category
usually turn on well-developed and specific rules guaranteeing a close relationship between the representative and the right holder, and they generally demand
a strong showing that right holders cannot easily litigate on their own account.
Yet some forms of representation—such as organizational standing and MDLs—
lack such safeguards. This state of aﬀairs should be reconsidered, we suggest, in
light of general concerns about third-party standing. These concerns may also
be relevant to controversies, like nationwide injunctions, with which the legal
system is just beginning to grapple. Because third-party standing doctrine provides a framework for assessing who may assert rights for whom, it can potentially shed light on a wide range of pressing legal questions.
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